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This thesis is an investigation of how United States
foreign policy was made in the context of German-American
relations in the period between the two world wars.

The

problem under investigation is whether the United States
was using a corporatist approach in dealing with the
problems of Germany and ultimately Europe and whether the
corporatist model is a good one for analyzing foreign policy
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development during this period.

Corporatism, as it is used

in this thesis, is defined as an organizational form which
recognizes privately organized functional groups outside the
United States government, which collaborate with the
government to share power and make policy.

In the case of

foreign policy, the focus of this investigation is on the
role played by autonomous financial experts, especially from
the banking community.
The data used in making this investigation comes from
secondary sources, both books and articles, and primary
sources.

The books are works written by historians which

cover both the entire period, specific crisis points in
the period, and biographies of the main people involved,
usually focusing on their foreign policies.

A number of

articles are also cited and these deal both with specific
problems of the period and also with questions of
historiography, especially corporatist historiography.

In

addition, primary sources make up a significant amount of
the data.

These include both memoirs of the key individuals

involved in foreign policy and also documents on foreign
policy of both the United States and Germany, the latter
consisting primarily of correspondence between the chief
government officials involved in foreign policy.

The

university library is certainly adequate for an
investigation of this type, though naturally a certain
amount of the primary documentation for such a project can
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not be found in one library as it is stored in archives in
in other parts of both the United States and Germany.
The results of this investigation can be summarized as
follows: the corporatist approach was used and the model is
valid for examining diplomacy in the 1920's, but fails to
explain what happened in the 1930's.

The methods involved

in formulating policy to deal with Germany and Europe
changed significantly from the Republican administrations of
the 1920's to the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
The change actually began partially under President Hoover,
one of the original "associationalists", associationalism
being another word used by historians to describe
corporatism.

It is thus concluded that the corporatist

model serves some periods better than others and is
therefore not the ideal vehicle for the examination of
foreign policy making over longer periods of time.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effect of
corporatism on the relations between the United States and
Germany in the 1920's and 1930's.

I believe the corporatist

model is a good one for examining the relations in the
1920's but is found wanting in explaining German-American
dealings in the 1930's, especially from 1933 on when both
Adolf Hitler and Franklin D. Roosevelt had assumed power.
The corporatist historians that have been writing over the
past two decades seem to skip over this period as though it
was an aberration and pick up corporatist development in the
post-World War II period.

But this is not helpful in

examining how relations were carried out if the corporatist
model is indeed useful for explaining diplomatic history in
any given period as the proponents would have it.
Traditionally, diplomatic historians have interpreted the
history of American foreign policy through dichotomies, or
competing opposites.

These have usually included isolationism

versus internationalism, idealism versus realism,

imperialism

versus anti-imperialism, and revolutionary versus reactionary
paradigms. The corporatist revisionism seeks a unifying
synthesis to explain the conduct of foreign policy rather than

2

relying on these dichotomies.

The old dichotomies still

have some worth however, and I believe the balance between
rule by elite versus rule by democratic forces is a useful
one to examine in the context of foreign policy in the
1920's and 1930's.
American diplomatic history began after World War 1
with the nationalist perspective of Samuel Flagg Bemis and
Dexter Perkins.

This approach emphasized the emergence of

the United States as a world power and described traditional
European style balance of power, bilateral diplomacy.

The

progressive, or revisionist historians, led by Charles
Beard, focused more on the intellectual foundations and
conflict-induced change which guided American foreign
policy.

This led to the critical realist historiography of

the 1950's and 1960's, exemplified by those like George
Kennan, who concerned themselves with elites creating policy
to pursue nationalist aims.

They emphasized geopolitics and

were critical of the influence of domestic pressures.

The

revisionists of the 1960's and 1970's, such as William
Appleman Williams, focused more on idealism and the wayward
capitalism that led to such ill-founded ventures as the
Vietnam War.

This economic causation approach was modified

by postrevisionists, such as John Lewis Gaddis, who tended
toward seeing policy as a reaction to the threat of Soviet
expansion, rather than a result of U.S. expansionist
.
1
d es1res.
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Thomas G. Paterson maintains that diplomatic historians
concentrate on four basic levels: international, regional,
national, and individual.

2

Corporatist historians take all

of these levels into consideration in their attempt to
include both internal and external factors in policy making.
The corporatist approach is most concerned with describing
the organizational form of foreign policy formulation.
Corporatist historians have described not only the
components of the American system that have influenced
foreign policy, but also, as with Charles Maier, the
corporatist reorganization of Europe in the 1920's.

3

Corporatist historians, such as Michael J. Hogan and
Maier, define corporatism as an organizational form between
traditional laissez-faire capitalism and state control of
enterprise and policy.

It recognizes privately organized

functional groups outside of the government, most commonly
business, labor, and agriculture, which through coordinating
mechanisms collaborate with the government to share power.
In this way public policy results from semiautonomous
agencies of nonpartisan experts.

For the purpose of this

analysis, business interests figure more heavily into the
foreign policy equation than do agriculture or labor, thus
they will play a more prominent role in this analysis.

More

roughly put, these sectors become bargaining units, along
with the government, which acts also as a mediator, and a
certain equilibrium is reached.

This was certainly the case

4

in Germany in the 1920's as described by Maier, though the
equilibrium was certainly fragile. 4
Critics of the corporatist model, such as Gaddis,
believe that it serves certain periods very well, such as
the 1920's, when there was broad agreement towards foreign
policy, but not for other periods, such as the 1930's, which
lacked consensus.5

He goes on to criticize corporatism for

ignoring differences within the functional groups, such as
the division between the international finance sector of
business and those middle to small sized concerns that that
were more interested in the domestic market.

Gaddis also

maintained that corporatist theory ignores how the
geopolitical situation effects U.S. policy (for example, the
increasing militancy of Nazi Germany), it downplays ideals
(such as President Wilson's post-war internationalist
cooperation), and that it ignores the roles of individuals
(except for Herbert Hoover). 5

Proponents of corporatism,

such as Hogan, refute these criticisms with examples such as
the attention leading bankers received; the divisiveness of
the 1920's; that the emphasis is not on consensus but on
power formation, and that geopolitical considerations were
the key to post-World War II internationalism, as well as
the Republican vision of American prosperity and world
stability in the 1920's.
Corporatist historians are concerned with
organizational developments in the twentieth century.

6

5

Capitalism in the late nineteenth century was dominated by
individuals, or the captains of industry, in the United
States.

What economic historians call the organizational

revolution began around the turn of the century and was
characterized by the rise of the corporation as the primary
form of big business management.

The leading politicians of

the time, led by Progressives like President Theodore
Roosevelt, did not fight this development, but saw it as
necessary to counter the cartels which had developed in
Europe.

Roosevelt wanted these corporations to work in

concert with the government and accept some restraint in the
interests of the American people.

The government would act

as a mediator between corporate concerns and other groups,
such as labor.

If this was the genesis of the corporatist

idea, the actual practice of it occured during World War I,
with the introduction of the War Industries Boards, which
established the pattern of business-government collaboration
meant to ensure the most efficient production and use of
resources for the prosecution of the War.
Michael J. Hogan emphasizes the need for diplomatic
historians to develop a framework that deals with both the
domestic and international forces that shape policy.

7

As a

leading proponent of corporatist theory, he believes it is
an adequate model because it describes the organization of
decision making.

It deals with functional elites in the

leading organized groups (like business, labor and

6

agriculture) and how they inter-act with government.

The

role of traditional governing classes is de-emphasized.

The

dynamics of the business-government collaboration form the
basis for foreign policy analysis in this model.

Hogan

speaks of a New Deal coalition that "elaborated the
corporative design envisioned by Republican leaders a decade
earlier".

8

But the New Deal focus was on domestic policy.

In the 1920's, Republicans collaborated with industry
and finance to push traditional Open Door policies and
dollar diplomacy.

Government would join, in an

associational relationship, with nonpartisan "expert"
commissions to scientifically solve problems of war debts
and tariffs and find the key to economic and thus political
stability.

Hogan goes on to state that good corporatist

historians show how the system was flawed and led in part to
the economic collapse of the 1930's as well as showing that
party politics, congressional pressures, and public opinion
all played a significant role.

9

Melvyn P. Leffler says that the contrasting themes of
political isolationism and economic expansionism are useful
frameworks for investigating American foreign policy between
the wars.

They just don't go far enough toward a complete

synthesis. 10

He doesn't believe that American policy makers

were naive in failing to make political commitments or
ignoring the political realities, nor does he believe that
the United States was setting up an international economic

7

system that would ensure its predominance.

He feels the

answer is somewhere in between, that the United States
wanted European stability not only for its own sake but to
further American self-interest as well.

The problem, as he

outlines it, was how to achieve this while maintaining
domestic priorities and staying out of European conflicts
that were not vital to American interests. 11
The corporatist vision stems from the belief that there
is a multiplicity of causes, both internal and external, and
that there are many participating groups in the formation of
international relations.

Charles S. Maier reminds us that

the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes pointed out in the
seventeenth century that the international system is unique
in that it has no sovereign and is not governed by a
standardized system of laws.

12

Instead it is a more

haphazard system that develops according to international
competition and takes into account political structures,
cultural differences, and economic arrangements.
In this respect, economic considerations are extremely
important to the study of German-American relations in the
inter-war period.

People in the business and financial

worlds played leading roles in formulating policy,
especially in the 1920's.

The corporatist perspective

incorporates these roles into a formal structure of decision
making.

8
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CHAPTER II
CORPORATIST BEGINNINGS
Corporatist historians maintain that the corporatist
structure began taking shape with the Progressive Era, when
government recognized the need to harness industrial growth
and mediate among the main interest groups.

On the

international level, business feared destructive price
competition and the hope was that government could
contribute to stability.
Corporatism became institutionalized during World War I
as War Industries Boards were set up to make the most
efficient use of the nation's resources for war
mobilization.

These boards were composed of private

civilian elites and executive branch appointees; a
collaboration of business and government which determined
price and production levels.

1

These would serve as the

model for corporatism and organized collaboration was the
key.

The degree of organization becomes critical for

determining whether the corporatist model fits the 1930's as
well as it seemed to fit the 1920's.
Though the United States did not join the League of
Nations after World War I, corporatist historians argue that
the policy makers of the post-war period sought economic and
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financial structures that paralled the political cooperative
structures of the League.

2

Some felt this development was

anti-democratic because non-elected people were creating
important policy that affected the nation.

Ironically

enough, as the elected representatives in the Senate
rejected an American participation in the League and the
Versailles Treaty, they eliminated any American governmental
presence on the committees that were set up to deal with the
reparations problem.

The result was that representation on

these committees would end up consisting of prominent
members of the financial world.

This was a continuation

of the war-time situation however.

And as Beth McKillen

points out, many Americans were less than satisfied,
especially those in the Labor movement, with this
centralization of wartime economic power in executive
appointees. 3

Dissatisfaction was felt by ethnic groups and

middle-sized business, which complained of corporate
domination of and profit from the boards.

McKillen believes

this formed some of the opposition to the League and
President Wilson's view of a new internationalist order.
But despite opposition to this Wilsonian view, American
policy, through the action of private elites, reflected a
desire for an international economic order.

This calls into

question whether the corporatist design was intentional and
premeditated or merely arrived at by chance and
circumstance.

11
The Republicans who came into office in 1921 believed
that economics would determine the level of peace and

stability the world would experience.

Growth and

cooperation were essential in their eyes.

Industrial and

technological progress had made the world more economically
interdependent.

As Leffler points out, this was not

necessarily an ideologically based notion, but one born of
the realization that political and military balances and
alliances had been inadequate to prevent World War

r. 4

Both

prominent politicians, such as Secretary of State Frank B.
Kellogg and Senator William E. Borah, and prominent bankers
and businessmen, like Owen D. Young, concurred in this
belief that commercial and financial stability were the keys
to peace and prosperity.

5

They felt international problems

could be solved scientifically through the use of "experts"
and business methods which would take them out of the
political realm.

They would lead the way economically,

maintaining the freedom to pursue their own national
interests through the Open Door, which would in turn
stimulate the world market and bring international economic
stability.

However, there were serious dangers in the

failure to recognize the political ramifications of their
economic policy, especially in Germany.

Furthermore, the

failure to publically admit and deal with the connection
between allied war debts and German reparations payments,
all the way through to and including Franklin D. Roosevelt,
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can also be seen as a critical misjudgement.

The loan

policy toward Germany, which offically began with the Dawes
Plan in 1924, calls into serious question the degree to
which government and the financial leaders closely
coordinated their policy and actions, which reflects
negatively on the corporatist vision.
This was clearly a transitional period for the United
States.

The 1920's was the last decade of laissez faire

capitalism in the economic sphere and the long road from the
nation's early fear of entangling alliances to interwar
isolationism in the political sphere would soon come to a
crashing halt as well.

But coming out of World War I

successfully and relatively unscathed, the United States
emerged as the world economic superpower and had a moral
egotism to match it.

President Harding felt America was the

greatest contributor to human welfare in history.

He was

followed by Coolidge, who said "America first is not
selfishness: it is the righteous demand of strength to
serve."

After this came President Hoover, who thought the

American system was the promise of the human race.

6

These

attitudes and ideals combined with the fact that the U.S.
emerged from the War as a creditor rather than a debtor
nation.

Republican policy would allow the private financial

sector to pursue policies which amounted to foreign
intervention while the public sector denied there were major
political implications for this intervention, thereby

13
maintaining the facade of isolationism and conforming to
public and congressional sentiment.
If there was a failure to make connections between
economic and political policies, there was also a failure to
see certain economic connections that would have caused
political conflict.

If politicians were afraid to make the

connection between allied war debts and reparations, bankers
were equally cautious, if less naive, in prolonging this
policy.

The circular flow of money from American banks to

Germany in the form of loans, went on to the former allies
as hard currency reparations payments and then back to the
United States as debt repayment.

Both reparations and

allied debt installments were scheduled to run into the
1980's.

They barely lasted into the 1930's before payments

were ended, first through a moratorium and then permanently
by Hitler.

But it was a political minefield to attempt

cancelling debts.

It was equally politically unpopular to

bring down the tariff barriers, which would have been
necessary to allow German exports into the United States to
a degree to which they could realistically have contributed
to Germany's hard currency reserve.

If the Germans couldn't

export to any significant degree they would be hard pressed
to raise the hard currency needed for reparations transfers.
The loan policy served as an escape hatch but would bring
increasing pressure on the German government, both at the
state and national level, to pursue an austerity program of

14
higher taxes and lower government spending.
Politically, the United States had expressed its desire
to stay out of European affairs with the Senate's rejection
of an American role in the Versailles Treaty and the League
of Nations after the War.

Economically, U.S. policy sought

to restore European stability and international trade.
German economic recovery was vital to these aims and to
accomplish this, faith in its currency had to be restored.
The loan policy had this objective.

But as it went along

increasingly unsupervised by the American government, it led
to spending sprees, especially at the state and municipal
level, by German local governments.

In a new and fragile

democracy they felt this was necessary to survive
politically as the economic situation grew worse, but it led
to financial instability and increasing political acrimony
within Germany, which was racked by political extremism
after the War.

7

The issue of Germany's ability and will to pay was
always very close to the heart of the matter.

Some

economists felt that those responsible for the Versailles
settlement were ignorant of the most basic facts of trade.

8

He began with the basic economic premise that a nation
cannot not sell if it will not buy, that imports pay for
exports; sums owed equal sums due.
war readjustment would fall,
other exporters.

The burden of this post-

he felt, on the farmers and

Mercantilism was dead but nations were

15
still trying to practice economic nationalism.

He felt that

reparations would produce the opposite of what was desired
(writing in 1926).

In order for Germany to pay, they would

have had to export much more than Britain or France.

Thus

tariffs were a result of looking at national advantage
rather than stability for the world economy.

He thought

that reparations were the greatest obstacle to restoring the
markets of Europe, a necessary condition for American
farmers and manufacturers to prosper.

He claimed

reparations were calculated on Germany's ability to produce
rather than its ability to export, especially with regard to
the Allied unwillingness to buy.
John Maynard Keynes was another believer in the idea
that reparation policy was ill-founded.

Writing in the

early 1920's, he worked out equations which showed payment
would be next to impossible.

9

He began by citing German

losses: colonies, mercantile marine, ten percent of her
territory, one-third of its coal producing capacity, threequarters of its iron ore, and two million men.

10

Furthermore, they were suffering currency depreciation and
revolution.

Even with all this the Allies had to assume

that Germany would be able to trade more than it had before
the war, because only exports could help them raise the cash
or credit they would need to convert payments.
But Germany actually had a negative balance of payments
before the War: imports exceeded exports by an average of 74

16

million pounds sterling in the five years ending in 1913.

11

The total negative balance was not as bad because of

interest from foreign securities and profits from shipping,
but these would now be eliminated.

Among their leading

exports were iron, which came largely from now lost
territory: machinery, in which increases were possible: coal
and coke, of which no increase could be expected: wool,
cereal, cotton and leather, from which substantial increases
could not be expected.

The losses of Alsace-Lorraine and

Upper Silesia were critical.

On top of this, Germany would

have to cut imports which would lower the standard of living
to an extent that would be politically difficult.

Keynes

also believed, as economists like Herbert Fraser did, that
German ability to pay was calculated on annual surplus
productivity rather than surplus of exports.

12

Keynes wanted to see the Versailles Treaty revised
through the League of Nations, specifically under article
XIX of the Covenant, which stated: "The Assembly may from
time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the
League of treaties which may have become inapplicable and
the consideration of international conditions whose
continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

He

realized this was only an advisory capacity and would be
difficult to implement, but felt economic changes were
necessary for the economic well being of Europe. 13
Keynes proposed a total reparation bill of 2 billion

17
pounds sterling, which would include lost property
(including ships) and territory, to be paid off over 30
years. 14

In reality, the Allies ended up demanding over

five times that much, 132 billion marks, to be paid off over
60 years.

15

This total, demanded through the London

Ultimatum of May 5, 1921, was eventually accepted by the
coalition government headed by Joseph Wirth, after the
previous government resigned over the crisis.

This began

the policy of "fulfillment", so distasteful to the
Nationalists in Germany, which meant to show through good
intentions that the reparations were unreasonable and could
never be fully paid.

Some felt that Germany launched a

successful propaganda campaign against the reparations and
that their resistance to paying was more important than the
ability to pay, when considering the fact that only about 20
billion gold marks were ever paid.

16

Keynes also proposed the cancellation of inter-allied
debts and sending the reparations to the most damaged
countries.

The United States was the primary lender, though Britain

lent more than it borrowed.

Thus the United States would

have had to sacrifice the most, having extended credits
worth 7.3 billion pounds during the War and another 2.3
billion pounds in the immediate post-War period. 17

Keynes

thought the huge, unprecedented amounts caused additional
problems because they were inter-governmental and not based
on any real property or assets.

They were paper

18
entanglements that the banks were not used to.

He didn't

believe that they would be paid for more than a few years.

18

The official American attitude toward reparations was
more lenient toward Germany than was that of the allies;
they believed capacity to pay should determine the
settlement.

They also denied the connection with war-debts

and resisted Allied proposals for cancellation.

Both Wilson

and the Republicans who followed him wanted American policy
based on the Open Door, a liberal commercial policy of
peaceful competition as opposed to the traditional European
model of imperialism.

At Paris during the peace

negotiations, Wilson had settled for a somewhat powerless
Reparations Commission in the hope that the League would
deal with the problem.

19

Secretary of State Hughes continued Wilsonian ideals
even though he represented the Republicans.
would eventually result in the Dawes Plan.

His efforts
But in March of

1921 a crisis developed between Germany and the Allies over
payment of reparations.

German Foreign Minister Walter

Simons met with British Prime Minister Lloyd George and
French Premier Aristide Briand, hoping to convince them to
lower the indemnity.

If Simons could not come up with an

acceptable proposal, the Allies would occupy key Rhineland
towns and force compliance.

On March 21 they did just that

and impounded customs receipts to compensate for lack of
payment as Simons' proposals fell short of approva1. 20

At

19
this point, Simons appealed to the American commissioner in
Berlin, Ellis L. Dresel.

Dresel,

in a telegram to Hughes,

felt the Germans were more sincere in their efforts to pay a
reasonable amount than the Allies gave them credit for.
went on to recognize one of the essential points,

He

"the

creation of important sums in foreign exchange is possible
for Germany only through a strong increase in its exports."
"An enormous increase would be necessary in order to regain
great sums and what dangers this would mean for the economic
life of other countries."

"The financial needs of the

Allies can only be taken care of by means of credits.

The

prerequisite for German credit abroad is Germany's financial
responsibility.

This, however,

is wholly undermined by the

Allies themselves who in the Treaty of Versailles have
reserved for themselves a first mortgage on the total wealth
and all sources of income of the German commonwealth and
states."

21

He went on to say that Germany would be

willing to take over the Allied debts and would submit to an
examination of its ability to pay by a group of unbiased
experts.

22

William R. Castle, Jr.,

the chief of the European

Division of the Department of State, warned Hughes to be
careful of any mediation role and not give an impression
that the United States was mainly interested in building
trade, which could cause friction between the United States
and the Allies.

23

Hughes then replied to Simons that the

20
United States still held Germany "responsible for the war
and therefore morally bound to make reparation, so far as it
be possible. 1124
On April 20, Simons asked that President Harding serve
as a mediator on the reparations question.

He claimed the

proposals as they stood would lead to "nothing ahead but
political chaos.

In his opinion no government could stand

which accepted Paris proposals."

Simons also maintained

that Germany could not allow gold reserves to leave the
country because this would decimate the value of the mark.

25

The next day Dresel again communicated to Hughes, relaying
German concerns: they wished to know what Germany's annual
productive capacity was and how a surplus was to be gained
from it and made available.

Further, "Germany sincerely

trusts that the President of United States will feel he can
nominate commission of impartial experts to make
investigations and present verdict as to these problems.
Germany is willing to agree to such decisions as are based
on determinations of the commission."

They agreed to make

up the difference between "the interest and sinking fund on
international loan" with compensation in services and
material.

They also again expressed a willingness to assume

the Allied war-debts.

26

Hughes replied,

"This Government

could not agree to mediate the question of reparations with
a view to acting as umpire in its settlement", but that they
"would be willing with concurrence of Allied Governments to

21
take part in the negotiations if Germany seeks to resume
them on a sound basis." 27
In a conversation with the British and French
Ambassadors, Hughes raised the issue of "when the
psychological moment had been reached which gave to the
Allied Powers the utmost advantage; that it would be a
serious thing to press to the point where Germany should
succumb to a feeling of pessimism."

He maintained that it

was a question for economic experts to determine how much
Germany should pay, that they should pay to the utmost of
their capacity, but that world economic well-being would be
served by having Germany a productive power.

He also warned

of the unforeseen consequences of resorting to occupation
.
28
as a sane t ion.
On April 28, the Reparations Commission decided
unanimously to fix the reparations at 132 billion gold
marks.

29

The United States did not interfere with this

decision and the Germans went away disappointed.

The Allies

threatened occupation of the Ruhr valley, the German
government collapsed and the new government pledged to carry
out the obligations.
Castle had wanted Hughes to push for American
representation on the Reparations Commission, but Hughes was
hampered by domestic political objections to such a role.
The most ardent anti-internationalists claimed that they
would block President Harding's domestic program if Hughes

22
carried through and Harding gave in.
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Senators William

Borah and Hiram Johnson fought against involvement in the
Versailles Treaty and the political entanglements they were
sure would ensue.

The Allies did invite the Harding

administration to send representatives to participate in
various treaty bodies and Hughes did send unofficial
observers, such as Roland

w.

Boyden, to sit in on the

Reparations Commission, thus skirting around congressional
1 a t.ions. 31
.
s t ipu

nothing.

The senators protested but could do

They did, however, make it part of the Treaty of

Berlin, the separate peace with Germany, concluded in
October, 1921, that the United States repudiated the League
of Nations and that the Treaty of Versailles would not be
brought up again in the Senate for a ratification vote.
This search for a way to avoid congressional pressure for
non-involvement would help determine Republican foreign
policy and led towards the corporatist solution.

In this

way it was at times more improvisation than design.
Melvyn Leffler believed that the American war debt
policy resulted from the "uneasy compromises between hostile
branches of government, which themselves were racked by a
multitude of conflicting pressures and irreconcilable
goals.

1132

He analyzed it in the context of the open door

thesis, which stated that American foreign policy was guided
by domestic pressures to seek foreign markets in order to
absorb America's surplus production.

He claims historians

23
who traditionally called American debt policy short-sighted,
provincial, and overly concerned with public opinion,
ignored certain groups who recognized the interdependence of
the European and American economies.

These groups included

the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the National
Association of Manufacturers, the National Foreign Trade
Council, the American Bankers Association, and the American
Farm Bureau; all of whom worried about depreciating foreign
currencies and unstable exchange rates.

They recognized the

link between these problems and the war debt and so they
were often the leading proponents of deferred interest
payments or the cancellation of part of the debt.

In

response, they wanted the Allied debtor nations to reduce
reparations, balance budgets, stabilize currencies,
liberalize trade, and cut armament spending. 33
Leffler claimed that these economic leaders and
interest groups did not go for complete cancellation, the
logical way to restore European purchasing power and
stabilize currencies, because they feared the public
reaction and the increase in already heavy domestic taxation
that would surely occur.
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The burden of paying off the

debt would be shifted to the American taxpayer.

Instead,

they believed they could attack the crux of the problem, the
onerous reparations, by contributing to a settlement and
then pumping up the European economy with loans. 35
President Harding was aware of this view among the bankers,
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such as Thomas Lamont of J.P. Morgan and Company, and held
regular meetings with them.

The Secretary of the Treasury,

Andrew Mellon, asked Congress for exclusive control over
these debt questions in June of 1921.

Congress refused to

go along with this scheme and set up a five man commission,
with the Secretary as chairman, to deal with the debts.
They also set up a payment and interest rate schedule (not
less than 4.25% over a twenty-five year period).

36

Congress

insisted on its constitutional right to control finances,
distrusted the executive branch, and felt exchanging British
and French obligations for practically worthless German ones
would be foolhardy.

37

They were most interested in avoiding

a heavier tax burden on the American people.
Leffler argued that the Harding administration was
quite aware of the debt's impact and its link to the
reparations problem.

In fact they gave serious

consideration to the plan of a prominent banker, S.R.
Bertron, which advocated Britain cancelling France's debt,
France reducing the reparations and gaining the proceeds of
a five billion dollar loan to Germany.
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It was ultimately

rejected because they felt Congress would fight it to the
end and because Commerce Secretary Hoover thought it would
be dangerous for America to become Germany's only
ere d i' t or. 39
It was because of these pressures that the Republicans
sought alternative methods to carry on diplomacy.

Initially
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Hughes sought an international committee of businessmen to
determine the German capacity to pay.

This was unacceptable

to the French and British without a reduction in debts.
Eventually the administration was able to negotiate a
scaling down of the British debt (payment over sixty-two
years and interest from 3 to 3.5%) which Congress agreed to
in light of increasing prosperity after the recession of
1921.

The Republicans would get their committee of experts,

but this corporatist scheme received its impetus from the
conflict between the executive and legislative branch over
economic policy in Europe.
The debt cancellation issue was strongest from 1918 to
1923 and probably reached its height in 1920, when a
memorandum was signed by forty-four prominent members of
banking houses and chambers of commerce which called for
debt cancellation consideration.
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That the debts were

eventually scaled down may have been due to a fear that
terms that were too strict would result in repudiation, but
the Congressional War Debt Commission was never clear on its
policy: it was not comprehensive and merely reduced interest
(even though the overall effect was to reduce the debt by
over 40%).
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Both sides, the bankers and congressional

leaders tried to use public opinion on their side, but JoanHoff Wilson believed that public opinion was not as big a
factor as these leaders thought it was: the war-debt issue
was simply not a high priority with the public. 42
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Michael Hogan, argued against the old view of history
as very short-sighted; he believed there was continuity
between the Republicans and Wilson and that the United
States did react to the reparation-debt problem before the
Ruhr crisis.

In addition he went beyond the new history to

say that cooperation between Great Britain and the United
States was greater than any rivalry between the two.
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In

his view the debt restructuring (lowering of the interest
rate and lengthening the schedule of payments) with Britain
was very significant.

It helped to overcome first obstacle

to cooperation, especially since Britain passed on some of
its savings to other debtors.

In addition it began a trend

toward finding a model for European stability.

44

He found

evidence that the British and American bankers were also in
agreement; the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, headed by
Benjamin Strong, and the Bank of England, headed by Montagu
Norman, both felt that banks should stay above politics.

He

cited the cooperation on the private level of the
reconstruction loan to Austria in 1923, which was requested
by the British and for which the House of Morgan helped
45
.
.
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s.

Maier felt Germany was also moving toward a

corporatist scheme because of the failure of German
parliamentary politics to achieve consensus.

46

With the

weakening of parliamentary influence, interest groups
emerged and bargained.

Maier identified the most important
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as labor, which was stronger after the war, the cartels, and
the ministries of the federal government.

The turmoil

caused by the acceptance of terms further weakened the
government, which, under Chancellor Wirth, sought
equilibrium.

Conservative elements, such as the banking

houses, refused to join in a coalition government with the
Social Democrats.

Tax questions were central to the whole

problem; they had to eliminate the deficit or watch the
floating debt rise, which would drive the value of the mark
down further, making the transfer problems worse.

The

conflict between the Social Democrats and the industrialists
was at the root of the problem; the government simply did
not enjoy enough widespread support to tax as heavily as it
needed to, which made the budgetary problems worse and
angered the French.
The strength of industry could be seen in its ability
to turn back tax proposals, such as the "seizure of real
values" (Erfassung der Sachwerte), which meant to take 20%
of all stocks and bonds.

The Social Democrats backed down

on this as they also had to on a 20% corporation tax and an
ineffectual 4% property tax.

47

The Reichsverband der

Deutschen Industrie was a strong influence.

In July of

1921, Wirth invited fifteen prominent business leaders to
help come up with a plan to raise foreign currency.

They

decided to pledge some assets in order to secure a large
foreign loan if the government would drop their socialist

28

tax proposals.

They also wished to see Gustav Streseman's

People's Party (DVP) in the government.

Many circumstances

seemed to conspire against the government in 1921-22: the
loss of part of Upper Silesia to Poland, Morgan and the Bank
of England turning down the loan proposal, a railroad
strike, and emergency legislation which followed the
assassination of Matthias Erzberger, who had served as
Finance Minister for the Social Democrats.

48

This was

followed in June of 1922 by the assassination of Foreign
Minister Walter Rathenau, an act which prompted the passage
of a law ''for the protection of the Republic", as even the
political right grew apprehensive at the spread of
lawlessness.

49

Wirth's government wanted a moratorium on

the reparations payments in 1922 as a new crisis brewed.
The British and the French were growing further apart
in how hard-line they behaved toward Germany.

Britain

wanted fiscal reform before any loan, France wanted
guarantees of payment, such as customs receipts, Germany
wanted a guarantee of a loan before any fiscal reform.

It

seemed that only the United States could break the deadlock
by some form of debt cancellation, but with the creation of
the War Debt Commission under congressional control this
.
. bl e. 50
seeme d imposs1

Hoover seemed to go along with Morgan

in wanting pledges of fiscal reform before making any loans
and American bankers did not wish to go against the
British. 51 But neither the British nor the Americans would
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take the initiative while Germany and France were driven
further apart by the pressure of the nationalist element in
their respective domestic political situations.

In America

however, sentiment was turning toward some kind of
involvement to bring about a solution.

The American

ambassador to Germany, Alanson Houghton, wrote to Hughes
expressing the necessity for action, otherwise, "the
Bolshevik tide will sweep restlessly to the Atlantic.
.
. " . 52
is
not mere r h etor1c

This
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CHAPTER III
THE DAWES PLAN AND APOLITICAL DIPLOMACY
The crisis of 1921-1922 turned to disaster in 1923 with
the French invasion and occupation of the Ruhr district,
Germany's most important industrial region.

This action,

which began in January, and lasted for about nine months,
would stimulate the formation of the experts committee to
deal with the reparations problem.

The French government of

Raymond Poincare, despite the opposition of Great Britain,
took this move in response to the failure of Germany to keep
up on its deliveries of coal and telephone poles.

Germany

was declared in default of its reparations obligations.

The

French thought this would guarantee payment as well as put
them in a dominant position in Europe regarding industrial
strength.

Previously, they had provided iron ore to

Germany, while Germany had provided coal to France.
Cooperative cartel arrangements had been discussed by
various industrialists, such as Hugo Stinnes, but this would
now give the French control.

1

The Germans responded by

stopping reparations payments and beginning a strategy of
passive resistance, which slowed production to such an
extent that it had very serious ramifications not only for
the stability of the German mark, but also the French franc,
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which was weakened by enforcement efforts.
The Ruhr occupation not only separated a key part of
Germany from the rest of the country, but the government's
financial support of the resistance through printing more
money was a major factor in the hyper-inflation that
destroyed the currency.

A coalition government, with

Stresemann as Chancellor, finally ended the passive
resistance in September.

At this point, Stresemann allowed

the Ruhr industrialists to make their own reparations
agreements, evidence of what Maier called the corporatist
development in Germany.

2

Stresemann incurred the wrath of

the Nationalists, who felt he gave in to the Social
Democrats.

The inflation was also due to a weak government

which did not have the power to tax sufficiently, a problem
the Nationalists contributed to, though they blamed the
Allies for everything.

At this point, Maier felt the Weimar

government was a mere broker for the interests of business,
which was trying to arrange for foreign loans, labor, which
wanted changes such as protection against excessive hours,
and agriculture, which wanted an abolition of the
. h eritance
.
t ax. 3
in

Local governments in the Ruhr and

Rhineland further compromised the authority in Berlin by
carrying on separate negotiations with France.

4

On December 29, 1922, Secretary of State Hughes had
suggested, in a speech, that the reparations problem could
be addressed by a unbiased committee of experts, with
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American participation.

American policy makers, wary of

constraints posed by Congress as well as skeptical over the
possible effects of direct involvement, wanted to direct the
course of events through economic intervention.

They felt

they could do this either through regulating and directing
loans or creating favorable debt settlements.

5

Evidence of United States reluctance to get involved
and of simultaneous concern over the developments in Europe
is clear in the correspondence of Secretary Hughes
throughout 1923.

He expressed concern but was reluctant to

commit to involvement.

Hughes said that opinion in the

United States was divided between sympathy for devastated
France and belief that the occupation would prevent Germany
from ever being able to pay: not only would their resistance
lead to further sanctions, but German credit would suffer
and they would never be able to export sufficiently to meet
obligations.

6

Hughes also "felt that in all probability

there would have to be some preliminary process of
investigation in order to determine upon a satisfactory
plan."

Impartial experts examining the matter would prevent

the type of governmental inquiry which through its
partiality would be bound to fail.

7

Germany's financial

capacity had to be determined and her credit restored.
Stabilization of the German currency was essential to any
solution, and this would most likely have to involve foreign
loans.
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The British pressed the Americans to take some action.
The British Charg~ Chilton wrote to Hughes,

"unity of

thought which either renders common action possible or will
be successful in finding an early solution appears to be
lacking among the European powers •

failing such action,

not only Germany but Europe seems to be drifting into
economic disaster.

In the circumstances, His Majesty's

Government have for long entertained the belief that the
cooperation of the United States Government is an essential
condition of any real advance towards settlement"
Furthermore,

"the solution of the European problem is of

direct and vital concern to her if for no other reason than
because the question of inter-allied debt is involved
therein."

8

Chilton said they would welcome either an

official or unofficial delegation.
Hughes expressed the government's desire to take part
in such a conference, but under certain conditions: it would
have to be advisory: "not for the purpose of binding
governments who would naturally be unwilling to pledge their
acceptance in advance", the "essential difference" between
reparations and Allied war-debts would have to be
maintained, and finally,

that "the Government of the United

States is not in a position to appoint a member of the
Reparation Commission inasmuch as such an appointment cannot
be made without the consent of the Congress.

The Secretary

of State has no doubt, however, that competent American
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citizens would be willing to participate in an economic
inquiry 11 . 9

Hughes wanted to involve the United States, but

in a way that Congress could not hinder the action and in a
way that would not commit the United States but would
contribute to a solution to the economic problems of Europe
which affected the United States to a large extent.

He

would be conducting diplomacy with private citizens,
representatives of the American financial community.
The French were also looking for a way to involve the
United States as their financial situation had deteriorated
under the effects of occupation.

But they wanted to "keep

within the limits of the Treaty of Versailles", which
allowed, under paragraph 7, Annex 11, Part VIII, the
Reparation Commission "could designate a committee of
experts to give their advice and they could ask the
cooperation of American experts. 1110 They were careful to
specify however, that this committee should not be as widely
encompassing as the British wanted it to be, nor should it
"encroach upon the powers of the Reparation Commission. 1111
There was also a disagreement as to whether the reparations
amount fixed on May 1, 1921 was to stand.

Hughes pushed the

idea that nothing should be set, that each government should
have the right to reject or accept the findings of the
committee, but to stipulate conditions beforehand would
defeat the purpose.
French terms.

12

Hughes was in essence rejecting the

38

The French eventually gave in to the flexibility
requested by Hughes.

Hughes then put forth the

administration's view that they wanted unofficial
participation (to avoid the Senate's confirmation right
under the Treaty of Berlin).

He also wanted Charles G.

Dawes (former supply chief to the American Expeditionary
Force and current president of the Central Trust Company of
Illinois) invited to participate as one of the experts.13
The Reparation Commission formally extended an invitation to
Dawes and Owen D. Young (chairman of the board of General
Electric and the Radio Corporation of America) on December
21, 1923.

A statement was released to the press that Dawes

and Young "have been invited by the Reparation Commission to
sit as members of an expert committee . . . as private
citizens without instructions and without the obligation of
making reports except to Reparation Commission."

14

They did

not really need instructions from the government however,
because they also believed a reparations settlement would
help stabilize Germany and help Europe recover, and this
would help the United States.

15

Hughes did meet with Dawes,

Young, and Henry M. Robinson (president of the First
National Bank of Los Angeles), the third delegate, for two
hours before they left for Europe, but they already agreed
on their goals. He did provide them with documents and
statistics and the services of economic advisor Arthur N.
Young, who would not sit on any committees.

16

Secretary of
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Commerce Hoover provided the delegation with similar
assistance.

As for the President, he told them,

remember you are Americans."

"just

17

The main purpose of the conference was to determine
Germany's capacity to pay and the experts wanted to remove
reparations from politics as much as possible and base them
on economic realities, which they hoped would in turn
eradicate the instability brought about by the War and its
consequences.

18

To accomplish this, a stable currency and a

balanced budget would be necessary in Germany.

The critical

factor would be the balance of payments: the total amount
could not be raised completely from internal sources because
transfer problems would occur.
raise funds from exports.

This meant they needed to

But special arrangements had to

be made thus a special bank had to be set up in which
Germany would deposit funds in a reparation account for
allied creditors. They stuck to economic questions and tried
to steer away from the occupation question, partly to
appease the French and gain their support for the plan.

19

Further stipulations were that the Reichsbank would become
independent of the German government, that the total
obligation would not be fixed (annual payments would be
determined), and that certain industries, including the
railroads, would be mortgaged.
write,

By February, Dawes could

"from this time on, I cease to worry'', thinking the

worst was over.

20
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But finding a compromise amount that satisfied both the
French and the Germans proved difficult.

Young eventually

called on American Ambassador to Germany Alansen Houghton
for help and a plan was finally reached in which payments
after the first five years would be tied to a prosperity
index.

A foreign loan of 800 million gold marks to pump up

the economy and help restore gold reserves was also a major
part of the plan.
transferring funds,

A Reparations Agent would be in charge of
about half of which would come from

internal taxation and the rest from the mortgage bonds on
. d ustry. 21
German in

All of this,

it was hoped would

safeguard stabilization and revive Germany economically.
But as Dawes recognized, the plan would not only have to
appeal to "the conservative judgement of individuals
expected to invest in a preferred loan", the bankers, but
also the public and the governments involved, as well as the
Reparations Commission.

22

So as much as Hughes and the

Republicans wished it could be done, taking the reparations
issue out of politics proved impossible.
The ability of the financial experts (the "unofficial
diplomats"), especially the bankers, to influence if not
make foreign policy was very evident in the proceedings
which led to the approval of the Dawes Plan.

The whole plan

was quite dependent on the loan and future investment in
Germany.

The bankers were very worried about the impact of

the instability in the Ruhr on future lending.

Thus J.P.
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Morgan insisted that the Allied governments agree not to
intervene in Germany's ability to repay, which was a de
facto revision of the Versailles Treaty.

23

Morgan exerted

further leverage over the French by granting them
100 million dollars in credit to prop up the franc as an
inducement to agree to the plan.

As Houghton explained,

"England and America have the franc in their control and can
probably do what they want with it." 24

Nationalist

opposition to the plan was strong in France, as it was in
Germany, for differing reasons, but the more hard-line
Poincare government was voted out and replaced by one led by
the leftist Edouard Herriot, who approved the Dawes Plan.

25

A conference was set up in London to put the plan into
action.

British Prime Minister Ramsey McDonald wanted the

United States to send an offical delegation to the
conference.

Wishing to avoid the appearance of offical

participation in European affairs, the administration
originally backed off.

Soon after, however, President

Coolidge announced that the United States would accept the
British invitation,

"for the purpose of dealing with such

matters as affect the interests of the United States and for
purposes of information." 26

British bankers, such as

Montagu Norman, head of the Bank of England, were also
active in both trying to make sure the British got a fair
share of German trade and also in trying to influence the
choice of the official Reparations Agent.

More
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specifically, they wanted the position to go to someone who
would represent the interests of the Anglo-American banking
community rather than French or American political
.

interests.

27

At the London conference, the Americans were
represented by bankers, such as Thomas Lamont and J.P.
Morgan, as well as government officials such as Treasury
Secretary Mellon, Ambassador Houghton, and Hughes.

Hughes

was supposedly there unofficially but exerted great pressure
on the French to accept the plan or United States economic
and diplomatic support could cease.

28

He knew the French

were in need of loans for currency stabilization.

The whole

process was difficult because it involved dealing with
Germany as an equal again, something the Allies were still
reluctant to do.

The governments as well as the financiers

had to be satisfied for the whole thing to work.

Ambassador

to Britain, Clark Kellogg, played a key role in getting the
French and Germans to agree to a settlement which would free
the Ruhr within a year.

29

The issue of who would become the Agent General for
Reparations revolved around the political outlook of the
choice.

"It developed during meeting that there was

unanimous desire, with Governments also agreeing, for
appointment of an American as Agent General."

30

After Young

turned the position down and the administration turned down
the choice of Norman Davis as too associated with the
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Democratic Party, the former undersecretary in the Treasury
Department and liaison between Morgan and the government, S.
Parker Gilbert, became a candidate agreeable to both the
bankers and the administration.

The bankers' role at the

conference was influential and probably more pro-German than
the State Department; "The bankers were fighting the German
battles better than they could do it themselves" wrote
Kellogg.

31

But this was necessary for the fulfillment of

the whole plan as it rested on the 200 million dollar loan
that the United States and Allied bankers agreed to make.
Another issue that prompted official United States
involvement, was the issue of American claims against the
former Central Powers and the cost of the American army of
occupation.

During the negotiations, Hughes had instructed

the Ambassador in France to inform Dawes and Young that the
United States would disapprove any settlement which did not
take into account American claims while providing for the
claims of others.

32

The issue was allowed to sit however,

as United States officials decided the time was not right at
that point in the negotiations to interject American claims.
This was complicated by the fact that American claims would
not come under the Versailles Treaty as the claims of the
Allies would, but under the separate Treaty of Berlin.

This

meant that they could not have a representative on the
Reparations Commission (without the consent of the Senate).
They were able, however, to secure an American as the
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Reparation Agent General.
In October, the administration decided it was time to
press for claims.

Hughes told Ambassador Kellogg in London

to inform the British that "no facilitation of their
proceedings in the future can be expected from the U.S.
unless they deal fairly with U.S. claims. 1133

British

officials did not take this well, believing the American
claims settlement with Germany was harder on the Germans
than the Allies claim settlement had been, and also because
they felt caught between the American demands for debt
payments and the French attempts to work themselves out of
payments to Britain.
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In January 1925, Ambassadors Herrick

and Kellogg were eventually able to work out an agreement.
The Dawes Plan was a beginning point for the
reconstruction of Europe and solid evidence of the
collaboration of business and government in attempting to
solve what were obviously economic problems and, not so
obvious to some, political problems.

The State Department

might have acknowledged the political nature of the whole
process if it were not for the prevailing mood of the
country and Congress, both of which were pessimistic about
involvement in Europe.

So it was that the policy begun by

the Dawes Plan drifted away from coordination and toward a
loan policy that was increasingly out of control and
reckless.
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CHAPTER IV
THE LOAN POLICY: COORDINATION GONE AWRY
On October 10, 1924, bankers from the United States and the
Allied nations arranged a loan of 200 million dollars to
Germany to get the German economy going again so that they
could make their reparations payments.

This was the act

that put the Dawes Plan into motion and began what would
become a flood of loans to Germany over the next few years.
Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover led the way, with the
State and Treasury Departments in agreement,

in trying to

exert pressure on European governments to sign debt
agreements and used the threat of an embargo on private
loans to get these nations, France, Italy, and Belgium in
particular, to reduce military spending and balance their
budgets.

1

At the same time, Benjamin Strong, Governor of

the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was using similar
pressure to make European governments push inflation down
and balance their budgets.

He told German leaders that the

attitude of American financiers "would be very much governed
by the degree to which confidence was felt in political
conditions. 112

This had a direct impact on German Foreign

Minister Gustav Stresemann's desire to gain a security pact.
This realization that security was a prerequisite for
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economic recovery pushed European governments toward the
Locarno agreements, which were reached in October 1925.
The Locarno Treaties established the western boundaries
of Germany where they were after Versailles and also called
for the demilitarization of the Rhineland.

Germany would

also become a member of the League of Nations, but
Stresemann was able to gain the concession that Germany
would be freed from having to take part in sanctions that
might be imposed under article 16 of the League covenant.
This concession meant that the Germans would not have to
jeopardize their relationship with Russia by taking part in
sanctions that might force them into fighting Russia or into
allowing French troops to go through Germany to fight
.
3
Russia.

British Foreign Minister Austin Chamberlain was

concerned about keeping British commitments to a minimum and
thus providing a moderating force against French demands.
The result was a lack of commitment to guarantees regarding
the German borders in the east.

The Treaty made the

possibility of another Ruhr episode virtually impossible.
Troops were evacuated from the Ruhr as well as the right
bank of the Rhine in the summer of 1925 and in December
Allied troops left the first occupation zone on the left
bank.

Though all of this failed to satisfy a majority of

Germans, it appeared that a political settlement to
accompany the D3wes Plan h3d taken effect.
The impact of American intervention was not lost on
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Stresemann, who commented,

"the whole question of the

reconstruction of Europe cannot be settled without America",
nor British Ambassador to Germany Viscount D' Abernon, who
said, "In all the more important developments in Germany
during post-war years, American influence has been
decisive."

Without American advice, agreement and approval,

"the whole course of policy would be altered."

4

This was

strong evidence that America was making a great political
impact even though it was refusing to make political
commitments.

It was the impact of American finance that

influenced political decisions.
The American government, especially Commerce Secretary
Hoover, sought to exert some control over these financial
influences.

Up to this point in history, there was no real

precedent in either the United States or in other countries
for loan control, though by 1920, voluntary controls over
loans to underdeveloped areas, such as Latin America,
Russia, and China had been accepted. 5

But Hoover began to

push for systematic control over the foreign loan policy.
That they were never able to attain it was one of the most
significant facts in the development of modern American
economic foreign policy, according to Joan Hoff-Wilson. 6
Hoover met with Harding, Hughes, Mellon, and banking
representatives Thomas Lamont and Milton Ailes, and decided
that the government should be informed so that "it might
express itself regarding the loans."

The administration was
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concerned because some loans were starting to be used for
military purposes in Europe and the government had no policy
to examine or restrict this.

Thus Hoover wanted approval

powers because first, the banks would go to the government
when trouble arose, secondly, the banks should use the
information and advice the government could offer, and
third, he didn't want loans used for military purposes, for
balancing budgets or to bolster inflationary currencies.

7

The bankers, especially Thomas Lamont, representing the
House of Morgan, which had provided a large share of the
American portion of the Dawes loan, over half of which was
American, and Benjamin Strong of the New York Federal
Reserve Bank, opposed any federal control.

Strong felt

control would "influence foreign governments in their
domestic policies."

He also claimed the government would

not know where to draw the line between good loans and bad
ones.

8

This may have been true, but uncontrolled loans

would have the same effect in the second half of the 1920's.
The bankers also would look to the government if things went
sour~

they wanted protection without control.
Aftei the Dawes Plan, American money began to pour into

Germany.

American finance had made the commercialization of

reparations bonds attractive to foreign investors.

The

bonds became even more attractive when the Federal Reserve
Bank lowered its discount rate from 4.5 to 3 percent.
Germany, the cities, which had become agents for social

In
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change under the Weimar Republic, became particularly
attractive to investors because they became debt free after
their original bonds were rendered worthless by the
inflation.

In addition, under new provisions being worked

out, the local governments were not responsible for
collecting taxes but were responsible for carrying out
welfare programs. 9 Under these conditions, local governments
became increasingly willing to spend while they did not have
to account for it.

There was political pressure to increase

social spending during recessionary periods, like the winter
of 1925-1926.

Resentment by industry because of the amount

of loan money the cities were getting caused further
political division between the Social Democrats, who headed
many local governments, and industry, which aligned itself
with the Nationalists.

The largest problem was, under the

Dawes Plan, governments were supposed to balance their
budgets and pursue conservative fiscal policy.

This was

made very difficult by the recession of 1925 which made
governments want to spend to relieve social discontent.
In Germany, the Finance Ministry was conservative, the
Economics Ministry was in the middle, and the Labor Ministry
was on the left.

They all competed in areas which affected

foreign policy because the link between domestic policy and
reparations policy was based on the supply of foreign
capital.lo

The loans allowed freer spending but created

danger as well.

To help solve this problem, a new
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Reichsbank was created which was more independent of the
government and thus hopefully more financially responsible.
Hjalmar Schacht was appointed head and he pursued a tight
money policy.

In this way both international and monetary

restraints became very influential factors in German foreign
policy.
It was easy for Germany to stray from fiscally
conservative policy however, because of the volume of loans.
Over the next several years, the United States would put up 80% of
the money borrowed by German public credit institutions, 75%
of that borrowed by local governments, and 56% of that
borrowed by German corporations.

11

Germany was the leading

recipient of the 5.1 billion dollars that were lent overseas
between 1925 and 1929 and the amount was twice as much as
was needed to pay reparations.

12

This flood of loans

worried some businessmen and Hoover, but the State and
Treasury Departments did not feel the need to get involved.
A related problem was arising because the Allies began to
expect cash payments, but the reparations balances were not
forthcoming and this created fear of a transfer crisis.

13

Another worry was that the German states and cities
were pledging assets for these loans that were also pledged
to the Allies for reparations.

14

This bothered the State

Department as well as Reichsbank President Schacht, who soon
had the states and cities getting clearances for loans.
State Department never did demand any proof of these

The
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clearances from United States banks however.

15

By 1927, the

State Department was telling the German government to keep
strict tabs on these loans but was not checking up on them
itself.15

The problem was definitely coming to the

attention of the Reparation Agent, S. Parker Gilbert,
however, and he would become the key figure in trying to
gain a measure of responsibility over the loan policy, while
not officially representing the United States government.
Hoover wanted to coordinate economic and political
foreign policy through a policy of loan control, but he was
defeated in this by both the bankers and the other forces in
the administration and the government.

In alliance with the

manufacturers, represented by the National Foreign Trade
Council, which included such firms as U.S. Steel, Standard
Oil, Westinghouse, U.S. Rubber, and International Harvester,
Hoover's Commerce Department tried to get a condition set on
foreign loans which would stipulate that foreigners would
have to spend a certain percent of their loans on American
goods.

17

Opposition came from Harding, Coolidge, the

Federal Reserve, Congress, and the Treasury and State
Departments.

Both Hughes and Frank B. Kellogg, who followed

as Secretary of State, objected to the infringement on what
they considered their prerogative, the making of foreign
policy.

Hoover, as the driving force behind the corporatist

vision with his "associational" views, felt the government
could have an informational and organizing role in helping
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. d us t ry. 18
in

The bankers believed however, that industry

would benefit from the loans regardless of the type of
control Hoover wanted, because it would increase exports.
Hoover eventually got his way to a certain extent when the
State Department assumed responsibility for controlling
foreign loans, but it was a very flimsy control; it never
turned down a single loan in the 1920's despite continual
warnings from Reparations Agent Gilbert about German fiscal
.
'b'l'
irresponsi
i ity. 19
Congress also came out against loan control after the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in 1925 and
1927, and increasingly turned the public against it on the
grounds that it could end up involving the United States
militarily.

Ironically, Hoover was against any armed

intervention to protect loans, though Hughes and many
bankers were for it.

In this way, dissension and

misunderstanding contributed to the lack of a coordinated
policy on loan contro1.

20

The apparent prosperity of the

period from 1925 to 1928, which saw very few defaults,
seemed to lull many bankers and the State Department into a
false sense of security.
The State Department's attitude on loans was to defer
to the the Beratungsstelle, the German federal loan approval
board; concerning a loan to the Municipal Gas & Electric
Corporation of Recklinghausen, Secretary of State Kellogg
mentioned that "the Department would not wish to confront
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that body, before it passes upon particular loans, with a
statement thereon of the Department's views. 1121

When the

German utility wrote to the Department requesting consent,
Assistant Secretary Castle reiterated that approval of the
Beratungsstelle was not required for corporation loans, and
merely warned them:

"In view of the large number and amount

of offerings of German loans in the American market, the
Department believes that American bankers should examine
with particular care all German financing that is brought to
their attention, with a view to ascertaining whether the
loan proceeds are to be used for productive and selfsupporting objects that will improve directly or indirectly,
the economic condition of Germany and tend to aid that
country in meeting its financial obligations at home and
abroad. 1122

He went on to mention that the German Federal

authorities were against indiscriminate lending when the
borrowers are German municipalities with unproductive
purposes.

He also warned that complications could arise

"from possible future action by the Agent General and the
Transfer Committee. 1123
The attitude toward loans to municipalities did not
seem to be much stricter.

Concerning

a loan of 10 million

dollars for the Rhine-Ruhr Water Service Union of Essen, it
was admitted that these were "corporate bodies of public
character"; as with the Recklinghausen concern, the stock of
prospective borrowers was partly owned by the municipality.
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Yet Ambassador Jacob G. Schurman informed Kellogg that the
Beratungsstelle did not have jurisdiction over this loan.
Further confusion was evident regarding approval of city of
Berlin and city of Frankfurt loans which had been approved
"in principle" by the Beratungsstelle.

24

Reichsbank President Schacht was very much in favor of
loan control, along with Finance Minister Hans Luther.
wanted Germany to direct the loans, not America.

They

Schacht

felt only industrial loans would increase the German trade
balance, which would stabilize the currency and help balance
the budget.

He wanted strict control over public loans but

the states would not go along with this.

Luther then

persuaded Reich President Friedrich Ebert to impose
emergency powers which would subject all state and city
loans to Finance Ministry approval.

The Reparations Agent

Gilbert agreed with this move completely.

25

Schacht and Luther both saw that tying American money
to German prosperity, that is to private industry, would
make America much more responsive to German economic welfare
and even get them more interested in lowering reparations.
If American finance could invest in German local
governments, with the guarantee of repayment tied to tax
receipts, they would have less incentive to worry about
German prosperity.

Furthermore, as Luther said, "the

foreign lender will not have the same interest in the
prosperity of our economy when his capital is insured by
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the public purse and the payments are not exclusively
dependent on the prosperity of our economy .

. If the

guarantee of the public purse were to become a reality, we
would soon become absolutely dependent on the foreign
capital market."

26

The private loans were often not much more productive,
but they were more politically acceptable in the mid-1920's.
The conservatives increasingly attacked public spending, but
local governments saw it as their only survival.

Industry

naturally wanted a larger slice of the loan pie and saw that
as a way to combat socialism as well.

This is what the

American policy makers in both government and finance did
not realize, that the political struggle within Germany was
very much influenced by the direction of their capital.
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One large effect that the seemingly directionless flow
of capital did have was to play havoc with German attempts
to impose consistent monetary and fiscal policy.

The

security of the municipal bonds was so attractive to
American investors, that money made it into the cities
despite controls.

By 1927, what Luther and Schacht had

feared was coming true: American bankers were not responding
to German economic needs, which at this point was new
markets for expansion, but investing in dubious local
projects like parks, hotels, and swimming pools.

Top

international bankers, like Lamont, grew very concerned
about the actions of so many less cautious bankers.

He
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wrote to Hoover,

"the manner in which certain American

bankers have been scrambling for all sorts of loans in
Europe is little less than scandalous,

just because the bond

market happens to be so excellent here just now that people
can sell almost anything. 1128
Still, the line between public and private was often
blurred.

Investment in the German public sector exceeded

that in the private sector from 1924 to 1930, but many of
the public investment went toward projects which included
gas, electric, and transportation works, all infrastructure
projects which benefited industry.

29

Furthermore, private

firms competed for public contracts and cities such as
Bremen solicited foreign capital which it made available to
private industry.

Nevertheless, this state "spending", or

the socialist tendency that Schacht called "Kalte
Sozialisierung", became an abstract target for the
.
.
conservative
enemies
of

30
.
t h e Weimar
Repu bl.ic.

Conservative fiscal policy became very difficult to
implement during the recession of 1925-26 however, as
unemployment rose and conflicts over Germany's ability to
pay reparations increased.

Revisionist historiography of

the last 20 years has generally held that Germany was able
to pay reparations, based on its fiscal and monetary
policy of 1925 and 1926.

But the price they had to pay in

domestic turmoil has also become an issue; it is not simply
a question of ability to pay.

Those who felt Germany was
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not committed to paying reparations claim they didn't
continue their policy of high taxation and lowered spending.
As William C. McNeil writes, the problem lay in the
realities which faced German policy makers and in the
transfer difficulty which resulted from Germany's poor trade
balance.
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The balance of trade was a crucial element.

Since

reparations had to be paid in gold or foreign currency,
which could only be earned by a positive trade balance,
German ability to export was essential to the working of the
whole scheme set up by the Dawes Plan.
Allies didn't want trade deficits.

The trouble was,

For a while,

the

in 1925 and

1926, depression lowered national income, which reduced
ability to import.

This worked with a slight deflation to

produce a better trade balance.

But the unemployment and

corresponding increase in social spending undermined this.
Raising taxes and balancing the budget would involve heavy
social costs.
American tariff policy was harmful to the German trade
balance and did not seem to be in concert with efforts made
to restore German economic health through the Dawes Plan.
The tariff was always a hot domestic political issue and
usually a regional concern.

The 1922 Fordney-McCumber

tariff established a high tariff policy for the 1920's.
most-favored nation status was another aspect of trade
policy that made reciprocity a feature of United States

The
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trade agreements.

Wilson and Harding had sought moderate

tariffs and the Federal Tariff Commission was granted
enlarged powers to deal with the abnormal post-war situation
but throughout the decade protectionism won over.

Pressure

groups which represented specific small and medium size
businesses were able to dominate the tariff hearings of the
1920's.

As Joan Hoff-Wilson pointed out, the tariff was a

stopgap measure, and not a means of coherent policy to deal
with the post-war European economic problems.
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Though some

flexibility was built in by section 315 of the FordneyMcCumber tariff, whereby the President could raise or lower
the rate to equalize it according to the domestic cost of
production, this was seldom resorted to: only 5 of 38 duty
changes under this provision that were approved by Harding
and Coolidge actually lowered rates in the 1920's.
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Hoover, as President, had a nationalistic outlook as well.
He appeared to be somewhat inconsistent in defending
artifical restraints, high tariffs, while attacking foreign
cartels.

The State Department also did not discuss tariff

duties at international conferences.

The tariff issue would

slowly build a wedge between big business and the executive
and contribute to the breakup of the corporatist structure
which had been developing in the 1920's.
In this climate of economic nationalism, it was
difficult for the Dawes Plan to be as effective as it might
have been.

It opened the door for loans which were

61

increasingly used to make up for what Germany could not gain
through a favorable trade balance.

The foreign loans were

contributing to budget deficits. In this situation, the
Reichsbank was caught in the middle, between the left, which
wanted lower rates, and the right, which claimed the high
domestic lending rates made Germany dependent on foreign
capital.

Schacht and Luther continually fought for fiscal

responsibility, Luther claiming that "in terms of foreign
policy, it is undoubtably impossible to present an
unbalanced budget 11

34
•

Reparations Agent Gilbert supported

Schacht in his conservative monetary policy, which earned
him the wrath of Germans who resented his influence over the
economy.

In addition, the international bankers favored

Schacht's policy.

Schacht, in seeking fiscal conservatism,

wanted to restrict the flow of foreign capital to Germany,
which he believed encouraged fiscal irresponsibility.
Gilbert also felt the reckless lending by many American
bankers undermined efforts to gain stability and he worked
to check this tendency, while at the same time defending the
collection of reparations.

The efforts of both Gilbert and

Schacht seemed to be working as the Beratungsstelle and
State Department stepped up their disapproval of excessive
public borrowing; the German Advisory Board began
effectively restricting loans in late 1927 and the State
Department expressed strong objections to a loan of 30
million dollars to the Prussian state government to cover
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budget deficits, under strong pressure from Gilbert.

They

later retreated however, and maintained it was the German
Advisory Board's responsibility.

This moved the German

consul in Washington, Otto Kiep, to conclude: "neither in
the Cabinet nor in the responsible departments (State
Department, Treasury, Department of Commerce) led to an
authoritative clarification and determination of the
fundamentals of loan policy."
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On October 10, 1927 Gilbert created still more
resentment among German industry for his interference and
uncertainty among American bankers with a highly publicized
memo to the Reich Government, which claimed "severe economic
reaction and depression if these tendencies are allowed to
continue unchecked . . . giving the impression that Germany
is not acting with due regard to her reparation
obligations."
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Loans did begin to slow down in 1927 and

Schacht lowered the Reichsbank's discount rate which
encouraged domestic borrowing in Germany.

But the transfer

problem grew as the loans waned and Gilbert began to realize
the transfer protection in the Dawes Plan was a weakness and
in need of reform.

Sentiment was growing for a new plan for

the final settlement of reparations, especially with payment
rising to 2.5 billion Reichsmarks in September of 1928.
William C. McNeil called Gilbert arguably the most
influential person in international finance in the last
third of the 1920's.
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Gilbert also operated in complete
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independence from the United States government in carrying
out the job of ensuring the flow of reparations payments.
His policies had great effect however, on the attitude of
the State Department and the bankers towards foreign
loans and especially on the German economy.

The United

States government trusted Gilbert to represent the interests
of the United States by representing the interests of
American bankers and international finance.

Schacht was

also a relatively independent operator who influenced the
direction of financial conservatism, but for different
reasons.

Gilbert sought the collection of reparations

through fiscal and monetary conservatism, while Schacht
sought to show that reparations could not be maintained,
using the same conservative strategy.

However, the lack of

an effective loan control mechanism for most of the Dawes
Plan period exposed the fragility of the settlement.

The

loans had created an illusion of prosperity in Germany that
was based on extremely shaky ground politically.

Division

among the political right and left only grew worse, yet
American policy makers in the government seemed oblivious to
this effect of allowing finance to conduct foreign policy in
the absence of a political mandate.

Norman Davis called

this diplomacy by capitalists "inadequate, undignified and
cowardly. 1138

But Hughes explained the rationale for this

strategy in 1924: "I may give it as my conviction that had
we attempted to make America's contribution to the recent
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plan of adjustment a governmental matter, we should have
been involved in a hopeless debate, and there would have
been no adequate action.

We should have been beset with

demands, objections, instructions.

That is not the way to

.
.
.
1 . .. 39
.
ma k e an American
con t ri. b ution
to economic
reviva

German hope for a favorable final settlement in 1929
was misplaced because it still depended on a reduction in
the Allied war-debts, which the American Congress was still
unwilling to go along with.

It was not a matter for the

bankers to decide and thus the corporatist foreign policy
had its limits.

Once again it would be a committee of

experts that would meet to set up a final settlement and the
United States representatives were Owen D. Young, and J.
Pierpont Morgan.

Once again this was unofficial diplomacy,

though Young and Secretary of State Kellogg were in close
communication about the proceedings.

In fact Kellogg

expressed strong opposition to certain elements of the
negotiations, especially those that sought to separate
reparations payments into two categories and thus tie them
to Allied war-debts:

"we will be collecting reparations from

Germany in satisfaction of the allied debt to us .

. the

position taken by this government is being most effectively
nullified .

• The American delegates have failed to

maintain the position consistently taken by their government
and that their failure to do so may have unfortunate
consequences in the future in so far as the protection of
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America's interests are concerned."
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This statement seems

to reveal that the foreign policy collaboration was not in
great harmony at this point.

The administration in

Washington still wanted no recognition of the connection
between war-debts and reparations, while the financiers
felt it was too obvious to ignore.

Though they were not

representing the government, Kellogg wanted them to act
in the government's interest.

The lack of recognition of

the connection would be most harmful to Germany.
The Young Plan replaced the Dawes Plan in 1930.

It

reduced payments from 2.5 billion marks to 1.7 billion
annually, and only partially protected transfers.

It also

brought back limited lending, which had dried up
considerably.
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That America would not cancel the debt

proved to be a major blow to democracy in Germany.

The

industrialists and conservatives wanted a much better
settlement, the Reich government took the blame, and the
split between the two would be final.

The very next year,

1930, would see huge success by the National Socialists,
Hitler's party.

As for American policy, they were able to

maintain the lack of linkage between war debts and
reparations and followed this illusion with a high tariff
(Smoot-Hawley) in 1930, which Herbert Feis called the
ultimate folly.
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This shaky edifice would fall apart under

the weight of the Great Depression.
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CHAPTER V
CORPORATISM UNDER STRESS: THE HOOVER YEARS
President Hoover presided over American foreign policy
during the critical period of the Depression's onset and the
last years of the Weimar Republic.

He continued the policy

of treating economics and politics as two separate fields
and this made his Moratorium proposal, his most vital
contribution to dealing with the world economic problem,
less effective than it could have been.

Hoover also

continued the policy of using unofficial diplomats, normally
represented by the banking community, though their influence
waned as the Depression went on.

He also, as one of the

original proponents, continued the policy of State
Department approval of foreign loans.

Under Hoover, this

approval process seemed to be as shaky and confused as it
previously had been.
A loan proposal by the Swedish businessman Ivar Krueger
provided a good example of the lack of effective control
over loans to Germany.

He wanted to loan the German

government 125 million dollars in order to gain a monopoly
of Germany's match industry in 1929, but he was in no
position to loan this much money and so recruited the
assistance of the American banking house of Lee, Higgenson
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and Company.

1

Kreuger also made the loan conditional on the Germans
accepting the Young Plan for the revision of reparations,
which the State Department was pushing for.
Agent

s.

2

Reparations

Parker Gilbert voiced objections to not being

consulted and he also wanted the State Department involved.
He was very disappointed that George Murname, of Lee,
Higginson and Company could give no account of how a
majority of these credits were to be used. 3

Gilbert was

pessimistic: "there is a real danger that new credits will
simply relieve the Government from the pressure that
otherwise exists to put its finances in order." Furthermore,
he felt the money would result in new expenditures, allow
the Germans to postpone reform and thus interfere with the
Young Plan and the mobilization of reparations bonds.

He

was worried about "how far the German Government and other
German public authorities are to be allowed to have recourse
to the American market for the purpose of financing their
budgetary deficits."

4

Undersecretary of State Joseph P. Cotton, acting for
Secretary Stimson, was unclear whether the loan was subject
to State Department approval.

He contacted Lee, Higginson

and found that they "have no information to the effect that
their agreement is in any way conditioned upon Department's
approval", merely that they had discussed it with Schacht
and the French.

Cotton also mentioned in a later telegram
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that presently "we are hardly in a position to close our
markets to every request for capital from abroad. 115

Gilbert

answered him by pushing him to take a stand and to be aware
of the "political risks which necessarily remain until the
new plan has gone into full operation."

He also reiterated

that he was "opposed to the present credit unless it is
clearly and definitely understood that the funds are to be
applied immediately to the retirement of existing debt. 116
Answering Gilbert, Cotton appeared to want no responsibility
for the matter of loan control: "I feel it would be unwise
to oppose this loan, first,

because it means going in and

attempting to control German action to put through the Young
Plan, which I deem inadvisable; second, because it is unwise
to attempt to control such a foreign loan."
avoiding the issue of loan control.

He was clearly

The loan was soon made.

Furthermore, Ambassador Sackett in Berlin "did not want
Embassy, if loan failed, suspected of interfering with
German Government's financial plans."

This perpetuated the

situation of official diplomats staying out and allowing the
banking representatives to handle diplomacy.

7

The Young Plan loan was carried out in much the same
fashion, with the bankers leading the way in establishing a
loan of 300 million dollars, two-thirds of which would go to
Germany's creditors and one-third of which would help
Germany reduce budget deficits. 8

The reparations were

commercialized by selling them as bonds, often in the
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American market.

So here the bankers were not only

putting the reparations on a commercial basis, but making
foreign policy by intervening in German internal affairs
(budget deficits).

They were also making a de facto

connection between war debts and reparations.

Thomas

Lamont, of the House of Morgan, wanted "the final
liquidation of the War so far as the settlement of great
economic questions is concerned and obviously it is is
greatly to the interest of American trade to have this great
Reparations question settled."

He also wanted Germany

to be "taken effectively out of receivership; that the
the heavy mortgage liens upon her railway and industries be
abolished, and that she be put upon her honor to carry out
her obligations. 119

They were attempting to privatize a

political situation, that of Germany's war-caused obligation
to the Allies.
Just six months after the Young Plan loan had begun
however, Germany wanted further adjustments.

Chancellor

Heinrich Bruning met with American Ambassador Sackett in
Berlin in December of 1930 and suggested a conference in
which Hoover and the United States would take the lead.

He

also wanted an end to the separation of economics and
politics: "if this economic conference only dealt with
purely economic questions, and was only attended by economic
experts,

in all probability an unsatisfactory outcome must

be expected.

The difficulty with all past efforts had been

72

that they had regarded the great related questions of
disarmament, reparations, debt retirement, and international
loan requirements as separate matters, leaving them to
specialists.

We must get away from this method: above all,

for me a complete understanding with France was the truly
decisive goal for a pacification of the politics of the
whole world", but he feared direct negotiations with France
would be hampered by French internal politics.

10

Ambassador

Sackett agreed with Bruning's appraisal and called on Hoover
to go along with the conference, but Hoover was not in favor
of a conference at this time because of his preoccupation
with domestic problems.
At this point, Young advised Hoover that debts and
reparations should be reduced by at least twenty percent,
which made Lee, Higginson nervous about their possible
overextension.

11

Both Schacht and Luther were, in the

spring 1931, calling reparations the cause of the
Depression.

Bruning was pleading for moderation, but in May

the Nazis and the Communists made gains in provincial
elections, causing a further polarization of the political
situation in Germany.
A serious blow to German hopes for recovery occurred
when French pressure prevented a customs union between
Austria and Germany.

The French applied financial pressure

by threatening to withdraw their 200 million dollars in
short term securities.

German and Austrian attempts to
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borrow elsewhere began a panic which eventually led to the
collapse of Austria's largest bank, the Creditanstalt.

By

June, this had prompted German President Paul von Hindenburg
to appeal to Hoover to intervene.

12

The situation for

Hoover was made more serious by the fact that some Central
and South American countries were also having a hard time
meeting their short term loan obligations and a potential
total default of 4 billion dollars seriously threatened
large American banks.

13

Secretary of State Stimson was for some form of
cancellation of the war debts, while Treasury Secretary
Mellon came out against such a plan.

14

Hoover came down in

the middle, though he may have tended to favor some
cancellation if not for the fact that an election year was
.

approac h ing.

15

Ambassador Sackett in Berlin convinced him

that a financial collapse in Central Europe was imminent and
Thomas Lamont suggested that the United States defer on the
.
. l e. 16
payment o f princip

Hoover was now seriously

considering a moratorium on intergovernmental debts, despite
claims by the Treasury Department that he did not have
congressional authority for such a move.

Between June 9 and

June 15, Stimson and Treasury Undersecretary Ogden Mills
consulted with several key bankers, including Young,
Gilbert, and Federal Reserve Bank of New York Chairman
George Harrison, and they all decided that the time was
right for a moratorium. 17

Hoover then conferred with key
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members of Congress from both parties and gained enough
pledges of support to go ahead with his plans for a
moratorium on debt payments.
Though Hoover was still relying to a certain extent on
advice from the bankers, they were not as prominent as they
had been in actively formulating policy.

Certainly the

Depression in general was a turning point for corporatist
development, but during this particular crisis in the middle
of 1931, Hoover increasingly relied on his department heads,
especially Stimson, Mellon, and Mills, to formulate policy.
Furthermore, a Moratorium on debt payments was also subject
to congressional approval, no matter what the bankers
advised.

In his memoirs, Hoover claimed that he was

motivated more over concern for the international economy
than concern for the specific interests of New York banks.

18

But these banks did hold over 500 million dollars in short
term credits to Germany and a default would have serious
consequences.

Hoover wanted a psychological boost to

result from his Moratorium as well as an easing of the
credit situation.
Germany did.

19

Another motivation was to act before

As early as March of 1931, Bruning had

decided to seek an end to the reparations payments.

20

Stimson was in constant communication with the British,
especially Prime Minister MacDonald, Ambassador Ronald
Lindsey, and Bank of England chief Montagu Norman.

They,

along with Ambassador Sackett kept him informed that Bruning
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and Foreign Minister Julius Curtius were close to an
announcement of a Young Plan moratorium of their own.
Stimson informed the British of the American plan for a
moratorium, which angered Hoover since it had not yet been
approved in the United States.

21

Rather than using the

bankers as unofficial diplomats, Hoover was now using the
department heads.

He sent Treasury Secretary Mellon to

England to consult with the British about the proposed
Moratorium and he decided to go with the Moratorium after
receiving Mellon's report.

Originally against the plan,

Mellon now urged a two year Moratorium, which both Stimson
and Mills agreed with.

Hoover eventually decided on a one

year deferment of war debt payments and made his formal
announcement on June 20, 1931.
Whether he intended to or not, Hoover had intervened
significantly in the political affairs of Europe in general
and Germany in particular.

Though it may still have been

financial diplomacy, a moratorium at this point was critical
to Bruning's political survival.

Unfortunately for the

Americans, a failure to adequately consult the French
undermined the effect of the Moratorium.
Stimson called the Moratorium the "boldest and most
constructive step taken by the United States in its dealings
with Europe since 1918."

22

The total indebtedness to the

United States had been about 10 billion dollars.
reduced by about 40 percent in the mid-1920's.

This was
By 1931,
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Germany would owe about 400 million on their next payment,
about two-thirds of which would go to the United States and
most of the rest to France as the other net creditor.

Great

Britain received about as much in reparations as they had to
pay in war debts.

23

So the problem was, as Stimson saw it,

that success of the plan depended on the French as well; all
the debts had to be covered by the Moratorium.

Hoover

however, was afraid of the diplomatic haggling and publicity
that might result, and thereby jeopardize the whole plan.
The French were not informed until the day before the
announcement.

Stimson recorded in his diary the response of

French Ambassador Paul Claudel: he said that "it was
wonderful, that he had no idea the President would go so
far".24

Nonetheless, the French were not happy about the

lack of consultation.

MacDonald and Stimson felt prior

negotiation might have been fatal to the plan and the
financial situation because of the reaction to negotiations
in both the U.S. Congress and on the part of French
extremists on the right.

Both at the time and in

retrospect, Stimson saw the main problem of the day as the
lack of flexibility:

"Time after time the issues which

divided the statesmen of the great powers were those on
which they themselves would have been happy to reach
agreement - and would have found agreement easy - if they
had not feared a hostile verdict from public opinion at
home. 1125
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The French were upset, not only because of the lack of
consultation, but also because they felt the reparations
might be officially ended at this point.

They saw the main

beneficiaries as the American and British banks as well as
the German government.

This was because the French had

already removed much of their credits from Germany after the
elections of September 1930, in which the Nazis made their
huge breakthrough.

The French did realize however, that an

American action would be preferable to a German declaration
on debts and reparations.

Secretary Mellon and Ambassador

Walter Edge worked hard to convince the French and were
eventually successful. 26
The corporatist model was still operating at this point
as private interests were still very powerful in matters of
finance and trade.

George L. Harrison of the New York

Federal Reserve Bank influenced and helped guide Stimson in
financial matters and the bankers were very instrumental in
helping Hoover gain the "Standstill'' agreements in July of
1931, by which the governments and central banks of the
United States, Great Britain, and France agreed to stop
liquidating short term German credits.

27

But the

Departments, especially State and Treasury were increasingly
responsible for the actual policies and would become more so
as the influence of the bankers waned during the deepest
part of the Depression in the early 1930's.
Another factor that may have been tipping the balance
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away from corporatism, was the recognition that political
normalcy was a prerequisite for economic normalcy.

At the

London Conference in July of 1931, where the details of the
Moratorium were hammered out, it was agreed that the Bank
for International Settlements should form a committee to
deal with the German credit problem.

The bankers formed the

"Basel Committee", but they realized that financial
stability and the restoration of German credit would depend
on political cooperation, as the Layton-Wiggen Report issued
by the Conference emphasized: "Until relations between
Germany and other European Powers are firmly established on
a basis of sympathetic co-operation and mutual confidence
and an important source of internal political difficulty for
Germany thereby removed, there can be no assurance of
continued and peaceful economic progress."
on to state a second problem,

The report went

"the increase in a snowball

fashion" of Germany's foreign debt.

They claimed that

"action which lies outside our province must first be taken
before any long-term German bonds, however well secured, can
be sold."

28

The limits of financial diplomacy were becoming

very apparent.
Hoover now had to face the question of what should the
administration do, regarding Europe, if the financial
community would no longer contribute to European
stabilization.

Hoover asked George Harrison, head of the

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to help convince bankers
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involved with loans to Germany to extend new credits.
However, all but one said they would maintain only their
existing credits and not grant new ones.

Thomas Lamont, for

example, said Germany was acting irresponsibly and thus
there was no reason for new credits.

29

The bankers would

not solve the problem this time; they had gone far enough
and could do no more, according to both Lamont and Owen
Young.

3

°

Corporatism was severely strained in July of 1931.

The issue of French security was bound up with the
economic problem.

France wanted only assurances that the

United States would not interfere with any sanctions, but
Hoover was still hesitant to make any foreign commitments.
It was becoming evident that some new tactics would be
needed and Hoover would eventually introduce them with
American participation in the disarmament talks and with
plans for an economic conference.

But, for now, he moved

only slowly in this direction.
Historian Edward Bennett concluded that both the
failure to consult the French over the Moratorium and the
lack of a political settlement were critical factors.

31

It

seems clear from this analysis that it was no longer
possible, if it ever was, to influence events in Europe
solely through financial mechanisms.

Germany needed

recognition as an equal among the great European powers and
never got it.

They never offered a lot in return however,

and seemed usually to want to use their relationship with
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the United States to gain credits and reparations revision.
France meanwhile, insisted on the Versailles status quo, an
artificial superiority.

The lack of support from the United

States and Britain, evidenced by the Moratorium affair,
reinforced this anxiety.
The Moratorium was a bold attempt to deal positively
with the financial problems facing Western Europe and the
United States but it did not halt the crisis.

By 1935, the

German default rate on the Young Plan commercialized
reparation payments was 99.6 percent.

32

The Bank for

International Settlement's coordination of monetary policy
through the central banks of the leading powers also came
too late.

The structure based on the private sector was

collapsing and the governments could not rescue it at this
time.

Increasingly, private industry began to strike

cartel-like deals to protect themselves, such as the export
association formed by General Electric and Westinghouse in
1931 which resulted in a monopoly on electrical parts.

33

Incentives offered by foreign governments also led to
investment abroad, especially in Latin America, and also in
Germany, where agreements between German and American firms
became common.
Business internationalists had enjoyed the "new
practical realism" of the unofficial conferences as opposed
to the old diplomatic methods of the leading politicians.
But this new method didn't take into account the necessary
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political adjustments.

Some, like Senator John Roberts and

Norman Davis, felt this was an abdication of executive
power.

34

Government promoted economic interests abroad but

put the economic foreign policy in the hands of private
individuals.

In December of 1931, Hoover proposed to

Congress a temporary readjustment in war debts to countries
which needed it.

They turned him down and the eventual

result was repudiation of payments and a loss to the
American taxpayer.

Later, when Hoover tried to convince

newly elected Franklin D. Roosevelt of the necessity of debt
reduction, he was unsuccessful.

But America was heavily

involved in the affairs of Europe through the corporatist
vision of American financial intervention.

By the end of

summer in 1931, the Journal of the American Bankers
Association proclaimed,

"the last vestige, the last

pretense, of following Washington's advice to avoid European
entanglements has been thrown aside .
at an end".

35

Despite this,

. Our isolation is

the United States government

would not completely cancel war debts that would soon go
unpaid anyway, nor would they waver from the view that
European leaders should solve their own political problems.
Two major conferences were in the preparation stages in
1932, in which this American perspective would surface.
was the London Economic Conference, in which F.D.R. would
play the key role in the summer of 1933 and the other was
the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

One
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In preparation for the Disarmament Conference,
Secretary of State Stimson told J. Pierrepont Moffat, the
chief of Western European Affairs for the State Department,
"the difficulties of the Disarmament Conference are largely
a series of bilateral European problems" and "our chief
interest, in the preparations for the Conference is to help
the other nations in making advance preparations for the
Conference."

36

This confirmed the view that the U.S. should

not take a strong political role in European affairs.

The

United States army was not substantial enough to be a factor
at the Conference but "when it came to the navies the
guiding principle of our delegation must be that the
superiority on the seas of the Anglo-Saxon nations must not
be imperiled", in order to help preserve peace.

37

The

American delegation was also hampered by Congress, which
under the guidance of Senator Borah was threatening an end
to the appropriation which supported the delegation.

38

Hoover did propose to reduce arms by one-third, but it never
happened.

"The

French are distinctly uneasy, and despite

all denials, view the whole proposal as a shrewd move in the
chess game of debts and reparations."

39

In the long run,

the United States was not interested in proposals that would
compromise security.

However, the fact that Hoover was

involving the U.S. in these two major conferences was an
indication that the administration was changing tactics and
no longer relying on committees of financial "experts".
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They would now involve high level statesmen and diplomats
directly in Europe to work on essentially political
problems.
The United States had played a role in disarmament
talks in 1922 and 1930 in Washington and London, but had
been primarily interested in questions of naval strength.
According to Edward Bennett, domestic politics and a naive
idealism were always at the forefront of American thinking
and this blinded them to the reality of the influence of the
balance of power equation that had dominated Europe.
Accordingly, they adopted two approaches.

40

The first idea,

favored by Norman Davis, the chief delegate to the Geneva
Disarmament Conference in 1932, was to make a dramatic
proposal, which Hoover did, but which had no chance of
acceptance by the French.

The second was the decidedly

uncorporatist approach of having Secretary of State Stimson
negotiate directly, away from the conference, with the
French, British, and German heads of state.

41

He did this

but was unable to bring French Premier Andre Tardieu and
Chancellor Bruning together.

The importance that first

Hoover, and later Roosevelt, placed on these disarmament
talks meant that they realized a new way had to be found to
deal with the problems of Germany and European stability.
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CHAPTER VI
ROOSEVELT AND THE END OF
CORPORATISM IN FOREIGN POLICY
The Disarmament Conference was still in progress and
the London Economic Conference was in the planning stages
when Franklin D. Roosevelt defeated Herbert Hoover in the
election of 1932.

Roosevelt had traditionally been an

internationalist but the Depression was the main issue in
1932 and getting the country out of its serious economic
difficulties was his first priority.

He differed from

Hoover in that he felt the solution could be found in a
strong domestic policy rather than seeking solutions through
international mechanisms as Hoover did.

This was one

difference that would help put an end to corporatism.
Another factor was that F.D.R., even though he would
eventually agree with the general line of thinking on
foreign policy of Hoover's Secretary of State, Stimson,
wished to distance himself from Hoover's recommendations on
dealing with the economic problems in Europe.

He not only

did not want to be associated with Hoover's policies because
of the public perception, but also because he did not want
to make any firm commitments before he was even in office.
The way foreign policy was made changed under the new
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administration, returning to more traditional methods and
turning away from the ''unofficial diplomats" of the
financial intervention days.

Roosevelt used men with

experience in the executive departments, Congress, and
diplomacy, rather than men from the world of finance who did
not have offical ties to the U.S. government, to represent
the U.S. in European settlements.
Hoover had some firm ideas about war debts, the
stabilization of currency and the London Economic Conference
which he shared with Roosevelt during several exchanges
between the election and F.D.R.'s inauguration.

Hoover had

already sent Stimson to talk to British Prime Minister
Ramsey MacDonald in May of 1932 to plan for the conference.
This wouldn't be a meeting of "experts" but a meeting
which Hoover wanted MacDonald himself to head.

The

Moratorium would expire in November but the U.S. was still
dealing with each country individually on the debt issue.
The debtor governments were all requesting extensions and
this was the pretense for the meetings between Roosevelt and
Hoover.

Also present at the first meeting were Ogden Mills,

from the Treasury Department, and Professor Raymond Moley, a
Roosevelt advisor who concluded,

"that the President could

scarcely have chosen a field in which there was less
probability of sympathetic cooperation between the two
administrations."

1

Hoover wanted to send a delegation to

prepare for the conference, an idea which Roosevelt
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rejected, preferring to negotiate through ambassadors and
department heads.

2

Roosevelt also made use of secret emissaries, like
William Bullitt, who he sent to Europe in December of 1932.
Bullitt was a private citizen with a solid grasp of foreign
affairs and who also had been part of an American delegation
at the Versailles conference, during which he went to
investigate conditions in Russia.
attitudes toward the debts:

He reported on European

"the outgoing American

Administration's policy, if continued by the incoming one,
might cause progressive falls of European governments and
resulting conditions in some countries bordering on
revolution."

3

Roosevelt also used Thomas Lamont to deal

with the French on the debt issue and Norman Davis, who was
already serving as a delegate to the Geneva Disarmament
Conference and as a member of the planning commission for
the economic conference.

But F.D.R. was using these people

more as gatherers of information rather than makers of
policy, as the committees of "experts" had been.
Roosevelt rejected using Hoover's diplomatic machinery
of an "interlocking directorate'' which would tie together a
comprehensive solution at both the London and Geneva talks.
Also, Hoover maintained that an "adequate and proper
machinery for dealing with the debts then must be created.
It is clear ordinary diplomatic agencies and facilities are
not suitable for the conduct of negotiations which can best

4

90
be carried on across the table by specially qualified
representatives."

5

Roosevelt went along with neither the

idea nor the urgency. Not believing in Hoover's theory that
foreign problems caused the Depression, he believed that
debts, reparations, economic issues (to be dealt with at
London), and politics were all separate.

He insisted on

debt payment as he didn't wish to battle Congress over the
issue while pursuing his main goal of independent federal
planning at home.

He would slowly confirm Hoover's worst

fear by becoming an economic nationalist.

Historian Joan

Hoff-Wilson didn't believe the debt issue was as large in
the public mind as policy makers would have it.

6

She cited

the fact that the number of periodical articles on the
subject had declined by two-thirds from the high in the mid1920' s to 1932.

Even the nationalists in Congress had been

unable to prevent the debt agreements of the mid and late
1920's, which had reduced the total debt by forty percent
through reduction in interest payments.

She felt the

leaders didn't attempt to mold public opinion, but merely
assumed it had a greater impact on the debt issue than it
really did.

7

Stimson, however, felt public opinion was aroused
during the Lausanne meetings in June of 1932, when
MacDonald, Herriot, and German Chancellor Franz von Papen
agreed to reduce reparations by about ninety percent.

This

still depended on the United States reducing war debts and
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it was the leaks to the press which affected American public
opinion and angered Hoover, who told Stimson, "in
fundamentals, we had no common ground .

. debts to us

could and should be paid; and that the European nations were
all in an iniquitous combine against us. 118

Stimson had

become a "cancellationist", but he was also angered by the
British and French attitudes and their effect on American
public opinion.

He felt that an increase in trade brought

about by cancellation would more than compensate for the
loss of debt payment.
political good will.

It would also create an atmosphere of
But he had to follow Hoover's orders

and could only express his disagreement in his diary, when
on November 23, he wrote: "We have to depart from purely
legal situation .

. there is another side, and we all have

to come to it sooner than later.

The quicker we get these

damn debts out of the way in some settlement the better off
we will be. 119 Default began again after the Moratorium in
December and became complete a year later in December of
1933, which moved Stimson to write that the largest error
was to believe "huge interest bearing loans made in
emergency conditions for emergency purposes could ever be
repaid by one government to another.
done, politically.

It simply could not be

And when to the political differences

there was added the peculiar tariff policy of the American
nation, the assurance of default became doubly sure. 1110
Despite his belief that the debts should be paid,
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Hoover still felt some agreement over the debts had to be
reached for the London Economic Conference to work.

Hoover

believed that failure to reach such an agreement soon would
result in general default.
with this however.

11

Roosevelt refused to go along

It was not that he was against a

settlement, it was just that he did not wish to rush things
and make promises before he actually assumed power.
fact,

In

he was willing to waive interest on the British debt

and consider all previous interest payments as payment on
the principle, with congressional approval.

12

As with

previous administrations, he was often caught between the
desire to accommodate the British on one side and the
demands of Congress on the other.

The Depression had

strengthened isolationism in the Senate and the
"irreconcilables", led by Senator Hiram Johnson, said that
Europe had to be rebuilt from within and not with American
money.

13

The British were not interested in this

arrangement of cancelling the interest because they wanted a
European settlement that also tied the debts to reparations,
a connection that Roosevelt, like his predecessors, would
not make.
Roosevelt used a strategy of playing one side off
against another in setting up his system of advisors and
department heads.

Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., wrote

of him that he divided the powers around him; he
"deliberately organized - or disorganized - his system of
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command to insure that important decisions were passed on to
the top."

14

This was quite evident in the way he built his

foreign policy apparatus with two competing and contrary
groups.

He listened seriously to internationalists like

Stimson and Davis, even keeping Stimson's State Department
economic advisor, Herbert Feis.

His new Secretary of State

was the internationalist-oriented Cordell Hull and
Undersecretary was the Wilsonian, William Phillips.

In

addition, J. Pierrepont Moffat was chief of Western European
Affairs and Norman Davis became his ambassador at large.
Yet at the same time, he assigned a staunch nationalist,
Raymond Moley, to European economic matters as his new
assistant Secretary of State.

It was this rivalry between

Moley and Hull which marked the early period of foreign
policy.

As historian Frank Freidel wrote,

"Roosevelt,

succeeding a cautious President who had restrained a dynamic
Secretary of State, instantly reversed the order of things",
often keeping both Moley and Hull in the dark as he acted on
.
15
h is own.
Roosevelt was against tying the war debts together with
other economic issues in a comprehensive settlement.

This

did not please British Prime Minister MacDonald, who
Roosevelt invited to Washington as part of a planning
session for the Economic Conference.

Roosevelt did not have

a specific plan, but wanted an inflationary policy to drive
prices up as a means of dealing with the Depression.

This
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went against what MacDonald and other European leaders
desired, which was currency stability.

He was hoping that a

nationalistic monetary and economic policy would work fast
enough to permit stabilization and tariff agreements at
London.

MacDonald and former French Prime Minister Herriot

had come to Washington hoping for some promises on the debt
issue, but were disappointed by Roosevelt's lack of
commitment, claiming that he didn't know what Congress might
allow him to give.
Roosevelt showed a clear departure from the corporatist
idea by choosing members of Congress and the State
Department as delegates for the London Economic Conference,
rather than members of the financial community who did not
represent the government.

He picked people who spread

over a broad spectrum of political viewpoints and also
people who had never been to an international conference
before.
Congress.

In addition, he clearly had an eye toward appeasing
Along with Cordell Hull, he chose Senator Key

Pittman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former
Democratic Party presidential nominee, James Cox, Republican
Senator James Couzens, also of the Foreign Relations
Committee, Congressman Sam McReynolds, Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, and Ralph Morrison, a financial
backer of the Democratic Party in Texas.
When the Conference opened in June, currency
stabilization was a large issue and Roosevelt's
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intransigence on the issue stalled progress.

He had taken

the United States off the gold standard hoping for a rise in
the dollar.

Gold countries, such as France, Belgium,

Holland and Switzerland, wanted a commitment to
stabilization.

F.D.R. refused, wishing to keep the United

States free to pursue a price raising policy.

Throughout

the period of the conference, Roosevelt may have delegated
duties, but he was making the decisions.

He also was not

using the bankers, a complete turnaround from the
conferences of the corporatist 1920's.

He was really

finishing off both the corporatist operation and the
conference when he delivered his ''bombshell" message on July
3, when he proclaimed, "The sound internal economic system
of a nation is a greater factor in its well being than the
price of its currency in changing terms of the currencies of
other nations . . . old fetishes of so called international
bankers are being replaced by efforts to plan national
currencies with the objective of giving those currencies a
continued purchasing power which does not greatly vary in
terms of the commodities and needs of modern
civilization."

16

. In publicly rejecting the currency

stabilization declaration desired by the western Europeans,
he claimed "American investors had trusted the debtor
countries as they did their own, and yet they had wound up
with worthless or depreciated bonds."

17

He also added that

the tariff, another issue of the conference, would not be
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lowered to allow dumping.

The United States was now turning

inward in an economically nationalistic direction.

No

longer were committees of ''experts" seeking international
solutions that would benefit the United

States~

foreign

policy was now in the hands of a strong executive.
Roosevelt took a much stronger personal role in the
conferences than had earlier presidents in the 1920's.
However the approach, while involving members of the
government, rather than members of the financial community,
seemed to lack the coherence of the corporatist approach.
It was true that Roosevelt wanted higher prices while the
Europeans wanted stabilization of currency which contributed
to a confusion of aims.

But as Cordell Hull related, the

contradictory views characterized the American delegation as
well:

"Few mistakes can be more unfortunate than for the

official head of a delegation to a world conference not to
have a chance to consult with the President on the selection
of the entire personnel - or at least let the personnel have
that distinct impression.

Otherwise there is little sense

of loyalty or teamwork on the part of some, and open
defiance from others."

18

Hull spoke from disappointment at

not being able to gain a reduction in trade barriers, his
own special desire, which, according to Business Week,
Roosevelt could have pushed through Congress in April, had
he submitted the bill at that time.

19

But Hull also was

frustrated by the attempt of Raymond Moley, the Assistant
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Secretary of State and more of an economic nationalist, to
attempt to go over his head and act like the personal
emissary of Roosevelt when he wasn't even part of the
delegation.

Maley was eventually rebuffed, but this added

to the confusion and typified Roosevelt's approach of
blurring the lines of authority among his underlings to
maintain the final decision making capacity.

State

Department economic advisor Herbert Feis also commented on
the preparation for the Economcic Conference in April, that
"there could hardly be worse difficulty and confusion than
exists."

20

James P. Warburg, who Roosevelt also brought in

to work on economic and political relations with Europe,
along with Feis and William Bullitt, said of the uncertainty
over commercial and economic policy, there are "two warring
camps within the administration with no umpire settling the
results between them." 21
In the end, Roosevelt was concerned with domestic
prices; he wanted them to rise and did not want them set
from the outside, and so he rejected the European call for
currency stability, dooming the conference.

Our aim, he

said, was to have "the kind of dollar which a generation
hence will have the same purchasing power as the dollar we
hope to obtain in the near future."

Only "when the world

works out concerted policies in the majority of nations to
produce balanced budgets and living within their means, then
can we properly discuss a better distribution of the world's
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gold and silver supply to act as a reserve base of national
currencies. 1122

Roosevelt was rejecting a world role.

The

domestic economy had to be rescued through internal
mechanisms, according to Roosevelt, thus pushing aside the
Hoover view that the international economic situation was
much to blame for America's woes and thus had to be dealt
with.
Most of Roosevelt's advisors,

including Hull and Meley,

were very surprised at the bombshell message of July 3, that
effectively doomed the conference.

It showed that the

President was acting virtually alone, and and without regard
to European interests.

Meley related Ramsay MacDonald's

reaction: he was "distraught .

.

. The President's action,

he bemoaned, had both wrecked the conference and shattered
..23
.
. .
h is
own persona 1 position.
However, F.D.R.'s desires in foreign policy were often
kept in check by his realization that domestic policy was
his first priority and if he could gain what he wanted in
this area, he would need to sacrifice some foreign policy
goals.

Disarmament was the most important foreign issue for

him and his perception of what Congress would allow him in
this area hampered his ability to make commitments in Europe
that might have contributed to some positive results.
The Geneva Disarmament Conference had begun in early
1932.

The problem revolved around the German desire for

equality, the French desire for security, and the American
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desire for neutrality.

As Secretary of State under Hoover,

Stimson believed that Germany had real grievances.

He also

understood that German foreign policy was a result of the
internal strains caused by the existence of a large number
of Communists on the left and Nazis on the right.

He

therefore wanted them to realize that (mutual disarmament)
"defenselessness was the best protection in my opinion and
would sooner or later force the other countries to
reason."

24

It was the French policy which undermined this

notion however.

Security was all that mattered to them; so

much so that Britain felt French preoccupation with security
would produce the type of Germany the French most feared.
Even Pierre Laval, the French Premier, admitted as much,
when he told Stimson that the Versailles Treaty's "effect
upon Central Europe was an absurdity, but it was a political
impossibility to change it."

Stimson responded by referring

to the "oscillation of history back and forth between
Germany and France and pointed out the Versailles Treaty
froze an extreme oscillation which was unfavorable to
Germany at the farthest point of unfavorability . • . Any
attempt to perpetuate such an oscillation would meet with
failure."

25

To this there was no record of Laval's reply,

or even if he replied.
Laval wanted a consultative agreement with the U.S. but
Hoover had maintained that this was an impossibility.

That

neither the Americans nor the British would give the French
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any guarantees meant that France had no incentive to disarm.
Regarding this situation, Stimson told Bruning in April of
1932, that it was like the "unfolding of a Greek tragedy,
where we could see the march of events and know what ought
to be done, but seemed to be powerless to prevent its
.
.
.
.
..26
mare h ing
to its
grim
cone 1 usion.

The two key American delegates to the Conference,
Norman Davis and Hugh Gibson, did not report that the French
were intransigent however, only that they did not expect any
guarantees from the Americans.

The French just wanted the

United States to "refrain from cutting across the course of
action determined on by the League, that would be a maximum
which could be hoped for from America. 1127

It was at this

point that Hoover made his proposal for the abolition of
most offensive weapons, including tanks, bomber planes,
chemical weapons, and large mobile guns, as well as the
reduction of land forces by one-third.

The French insisted

on consultation and the Americans replied that this could
not be put in treaty form.

28

The Germans pushed for

equality at the Conference, which was going nowhere by the
time F.D.R. came into office.
The Conference reconvened, after a recess, in February
of 1933.

By March, serious Nazi terrorism had begun with

the Reichstag fire and the ensuing emergency decrees which
first outlawed the Communist Party, the alleged perpetrator
of the fire, and soon effectively put an end to all civil
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rights in Germany.

At Geneva, Ramsay MacDonald claimed,

"either Germany is given justice and freedom or Europe will
risk destruction."

29

MacDonald put forth a plan that gave

both concessions to Germany and reassurance to France.
MacDonald also wanted to tie in American involvement with
the war debt question, which Roosevelt wouldn't do.

30

MacDonald's plan called for consultation upon the
identification of an aggressor, but this would upset the
neutrality that Congress insisted upon.
recognized the German threat:

Still, Roosevelt

"We regard Germany as the only

possible obstacle to a Disarmament Treaty."

31

Hull echoed

the sentiment after receiving a telegram from Ambassador
Hugh Gibson from Geneva.

He believed that in the case of a

complete breakdown in the Conference, which seemed likely,
that Germany would immediately disregard the disarmament
clauses of the Versailles Treaty and rearm in earnest.

32

In

this regard, Gibson reported that the issue was one of
relations among the European nations and that American
disarmament was no issue at all.

What the French were

concerned about was the American political position toward
Europe.

What they wanted to know specifically, was whether,

if Germany became an aggressor, the United States would
uphold their rights as a neutral and hold to the traditional
policy of freedom of the seas, in the case of an application
of sanctions against Germany.

Gibson favored refraining

from any action which would defeat sanctions, in exchange

102
for a French guarantee of disarmament.

33

Norman Davis, the chief delegate at the Conference for
the United States, also recognized both the dangerous
consequences of an adjournment and the connection of
disarmament to economic questions.

Both he and Hull pushed

these views on Roosevelt and F.D.R. seemed to take them to
heart.

It was still Roosevelt's decision however, as he had

taken over firm control of the foreign policy process.

In

May, Roosevelt received Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, again the
president of the German Reichsbank, who was in Washington to
talk about restructuring debts.

Roosevelt told Schacht

however, that he insisted that Germany remain at current
levels in armaments, and that "we would support every
possible effort to have the offensive armament of every
other nation brought down to the German level.

11

34

It was at

this point that he made his comment about Germany being the
main obstacle to disarmament and he wanted Schacht to report
these views to Hitler as soon as possible.

Schacht was more

interested in communicating the point that German
obligations would no longer be paid in foreign currency, in
essence defaulting on securities purchased throughout the
1920's.

Hull reportedly reacted with indignance while

Schacht reported that there were no hard feelings.

There

are differing versions of who got the best of these
meetings, the German, or Hull and Roosevelt

35

Nonetheless,

it was indicative of who was now presiding over foreign
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policy, especially issues that dealt with economics.
Roosevelt was taking the lead.
The President also asserted himself in a speech on May
16, 1933, which was meant to influence Hitler, who had a
speech planned for May 17.

He came out strongly for peace,

joint security, and the elimination of offensive weapons.
Hitler's speech the following day was conciliatory: "Germany
is ready immediately to endorse the American President's
magnanimous proposal to put up the powerful United States as
a guarantor of peace."

36

Along with Davis's speech in

Geneva, which called for a United States determination to
consult, determine guilt, and take measures to refrain from
action which would defeat collective action, the western
Europeans were hopeful and F.D.R. himself felt that he had
prevented war.

But there was too much divergence between

Hitler's speech and his actions and Congress gave no
endorsement of such a guarantee from the United States

The

efforts of 1933 were doomed to fail and the United States
would turn inward.
Part of the problem was that Roosevelt would not fight
the Senate's Johnson Amendment of May 1933, that sought to
put a ban on exports in a dispute to all countries involved,
taking away presidential discretion.

Another was the

ignorance of balance of power considerations, as evidenced
by Davis' statement for Roosevelt on May 15, 1933: "It does
not contribute to peace and stability in Europe to keep the
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largest and most populous of the nations (Germany) in a
permanent condition of inequality."

36

German superiority

and its desire for further domination of the continent was
a major factor in the outbreak of World War I.
Roosevelt had raised the hopes of the western Europeans
only leave them disappointed at London and Geneva.

Unlike

the Republicans who preceded him, he attempted no
corporatist way around the impasse, though unlike them, he
saw a need for political as well as economic commitments.
It was the timing of the political and content of the
economic that was disputed.

But he had taken the lead, to

the point of ignoring the recommendations of his delegation
at London, and did nothing to back up Davis' words at
Geneva, deferring instead to the Johnson Amendment.

The

discredited bankers were now on the outside however, as
F.D.R. took control of the foreign policy process.

He

merely chose to sacrifice more control over foreign affairs
to gain what he wanted domestically.
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CHAPTER VII
THE UNCERTAINTY OF POLICY APPROACH IN THE MID-1930's
Corporatist historians write about a corporate design
or corporate liberalism in the 1930's, but it appears to be
confined to domestic politics.

Michael Hogan claims to

"have tried to show how the Great Depression of the 1930s
combined with changes in the industrial structure to produce
the New Deal coalition", but focuses more on the design of
the 1920's and the post-World War II reconstruction of
Europe when it comes to foreign policy.

1

Likewise, Ellis

Hawley writes about the 1930's "as the efforts of a
pluralistic social order with liberal commitments to find
private structures and elites capable of correcting
perceived ills and malfunctions .

. in which state

agencies collaborated with and became attached to private
orders."

2

He mentions as examples the Agricultural

Adjustment Act, the National Labor Relations Board, and
other attempts of state action to produce new private
orders.

In a related article, Kim McQuaid tells how this

corporate liberalism was in recession in the late 1930's
because of business disillusionment with the National
. .
t.ion. 3
Recovery Ad m1n1stra

If anything, there was less cooperation and shared

w.
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interests between government and business in the 1930's
regarding the international scene.

As Emily Rosenberg

pointed out, the successful companies had to negotiate their
own agreements with foreign governments as business went
multinational while governments became nationalistic.
cited the oil companies as a good example.

4

She

The new

administration moved away from liberal internationalism and
toward a regulatory system that hopefully would produce new
powers for the executive branch.
The Depression had certainly changed the policy of the
1920's.

The bankers had lost influence as well as the

ability or the desire to loan Germany more money.

There was

no chance of any continuance of the sort of diplomacy that
was characterized by the "committees of experts''.

Also, the

Depression had helped bring Hitler to power in Germany and
Nazi aims were very unclear to the United States in 1933,
which helped further confuse policy toward Germany.
As early as December of 1931, a memo prepared in the
State Department observed that Hitler's "groups will attain
power soon" and that his "program and ideas seem to resemble
those of Fascist Italy" especially when it came to the
relationship of government and industry.

5

But the early

observations on Hitler were also mistaken in one crucial
regard; that "Hitlerism is based on the old Hohenzollern and
Prussian idea of strong centralization, imperialism and
expansion."

6

It is true that Hitler favored these things,
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but it went much deeper than this: as historian Brooks Van
Everen pointed out, well into the period when Hitler had
already assumed power, American policy makers were still
equating Hitler with traditional German conservatism,
maintaining that the Nazis relied on the monarchists, the
Prussian Junkers, the army officers, and the large
· d ustr1a
· l'1sts.
1n

7

As David Schoenbaum pointed out, the Nazi

revolution came as much from the lower and middle classes as
anywhere, though it didn't come from any one group.

8

Roosevelt and Hull went with the traditional line of
thinking in 1933.

In his memoirs, foreign policy expert

George Kennen was "shocked to realize" that Roosevelt "still
pictured Prussian Junkertum as a mainstay of Hitler's
power."

9

The administration seemed to be ignoring evidence that
the Nazis had widespread support.

Ambassador Sackett wrote

from Berlin regarding the March 1933 elections that,
"Perhaps the most remarkable thing about this election is
that an anti-democratic party, with avowed dictatorial
aspirations, has managed to obtain power by means of the
secret ballot. 1110

Later, the new Ambassador, William E.

Dodd, claimed that the revolution would reorganize and
restructure society along Nazi lines and George Messersmith,
Consul General at the time, wrote that "no government has
rested more firmly on the support of a greater proportion of
the general population than does the German population of
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today." 11

It was the misperceptions in Washington of the

radical nature of the Nazis that appeared to slow a more
dynamic approach to the problem, along with a preoccupation
with domestic issues.
The Roosevelt administration in Washington was not the
only one to be caught by the "Diplomacy of Surprise", as
Michael I. Handel called it in his book of the same name.
He maintained that Hitler went after the diplomatic
surprise, or "fait accompli", between 1933 and 1936, by
surprising stronger neighbors during a period of rebuilding
militarily while trying to avoid retaliation.

12

After this

period, he was able to shift to a strategy of ultimatums,
which helped him overcome the Versailles Treaty restrictions
and gain what other German leaders had failed to get.
Hitler was not from the old European school of diplomacy,
which the other European leaders had hoped and expected he
would be, and they recognized this too late.

He often used

deception, as with the peace speech of May 17, 1933, which
was a response to Roosevelt's warning speech of the day
before.
Throughout 1933, Germany was looking for a way to gain
respectability in the disarmament talks while always looking
for a way to make it look like the French would be to blame
if the talks failed.

They claimed that "At the Disarmament

Conference Germany had never demanded more than to be
permitted to possess the same means of defense as all other
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States. 1113

Foreign Minister Neurath wrote "that if a

failure of the Conference really proves inevitable,

the lack

of an intention to disarm on the part of France must appear
as the cause 1114

When the Germans did pull out of the

Conference and the League of Nations in October, the
reaction in the United States was against Hitler but more
isolationist than ever:

Roosevelt and Hull informed Davis

in Geneva, that "we are not interested in the political
elements or any purely European aspect of the picture 11 •

15

American foreign policy toward Germany was affected by
some conflicting reports from Germany.

Leon Dominican, the

Consul General in Stuttgart, wrote to Hull in April, of the
tendency toward the "cynical militarism of their
predecessors of pre-Weimar days", perpetuating the idea of a
.
16
return to conservatism.

. 1 Attac h'e in
.
T h e Commercia
Ber l'in,

Douglas Miller, wrote that the Nazis were "young, ignorant,
romantic" misfits, wanting a "return to medieval status
where the individual does not have to do his own
thinking. 1117

He believed that Mein Kampf was propaganda and

that the military threat was not great.

This was in

conflict with some of the other reports and created a
certain amount of confusion.

Still, Dodd and Messersmith

were diplomats that Roosevelt had a lot of faith in, and
their reports were consistently pessimistic and full of
warning about the situation in Germany.
Besides the conflicting reports, the men most involved
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in the foreign policy process at this time, brought
different perceptions and interpretations, and thus
different recommendations to the problem of Nazi Germany.
Ambassador Dodd, Secretary of State Hull, and the State
Department's chief of the Division of Western European
Affairs, Jay Pierrepont Moffat, all had an impact on the
formulation of policy, yet held divergent views.

According

to historian Stefan H. Leader, this was important in the
early years of the Roosevelt administration, but less so
after 1935, when Moffat was transferred and the views of
Hull and Dodd became less divergent.

17

Dodd, who wanted

cooperation with the European democracies to stop Germany,
was an economic determinist, who believed in the value of
free trade to avoid conflict, while Moffat was more of an
isolationist who also saw a need to protect investments.

18

Hull and Dodd were both influenced by the failure of
protectionist policy in the 1920's and early 1930's and its
effect on Germany's inability to pay reparations.
Another factor in foreign policy was the attitude of
the Senate.
a high point.
period.

In early 1934 isolationist sentiment was not at
Roosevelt had relative freedom during this

He was able to gain the recognition of the Soviet

Union, in the hope that new markets might be opened.

He

also worked to keep the Anglo-American-Japanese naval
agreements intact at the 5:5:3 ratio, which was eventually
rejected by Japan and led to Roosevelt gaining a large
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increase in the naval budget by 1936.

The Reciprocal Trade

Agreements Act in 1934 led to an increase in trade if not
making it freer.

By 1935, however, sentiment turned against

involvement in European affairs as the threat of war in
Europe increased.
Yet in one of the most crucial tests of the
administration's ability to influence affairs in Europe,
they came up empty.

Roosevelt went along with a State

Department desire to sponsor a bill that meant the United
States would be "willing to consult with other states in
case of a threat to the peace, with a view to averting
conflict", and would "refrain from any action tending to
defeat collective effort" to restore the peace.

18

Hull

called this "a radical change in the traditional attitude of
this country toward two old principles -- neutrality and
freedom of the seas.

It meant that, if other nations

instituted sanctions against a nation they deemed an
aggressor, we would do nothing to interfere with such
sanctions if we determined on our own that the other nations
had made the right choice of the aggressor 11

•

19

The Senate

Foreign Relations Committee moved against it however, and
attached amendments that would apply an embargo to both
parties in a dispute, taking away the President's
discretionary power. Roosevelt did not fight this, despite
protest from Hull.

This was indicative of what some

historians felt was a lack of initiative on Roosevelt's part

114
toward foreign policy both at this time and later,
especially during the Czech crisis of 1938. 21
Aside from the question of what the United States
should do about an increasingly threatening Germany, the
main issues in American- German relations in the mid-1930's
had to do with trade, discrimination against American
lenders (especially holders of German bonds), the treatment
of Jews, and disarmament (which had to do with the original
question).

For Secretary of State Hull, trade was always a

key issue, because of his belief in the contribution of
freer trade toward international peace and prosperity.

To

this extent, Hull didn't like the growing protest against
German treatment of Jews because of its possible negative
effect on economic relations.

Roosevelt told Dodd that the

United States could "do nothing" as it was not "not a
governmental affair 11 .

22

The State Department economic

advisor, Herbert Feis, later summarized the attitude toward
tackling the problem of the Nazi treatment of Jews: "that it
was inadvisable •

• our chances of securing the

cooperation of the Nazi regime in international economic and
political affairs and in disarmament by interfering to
protest the Jewish and other minorities in Germany.

Not

only inadvisable but probably futile. 1123
Of more practical interest to Hull and Roosevelt was
the trade issue, because they had more control over it.

The

trade issue was one which could also put them back into an
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internationalist mode, rather than looking inward.

One

reason for this was that the first year of the New Deal had
not brought quick recovery and some new tactics were in
order.

The vehicle for this would be the Reciprocal Trade

Agreements Act.

Lloyd

c.

Gardner called this act "the basis

of New Deal foreign economic policy."

24

In fighting for his

trade liberalism, Hull was trying to gain more control over
foreign policy for the President and State Department.

The

key was to gain presidential discretion over the raising and
lowering of tariffs and the goal was to restore foreign
markets and play a greater role in the world economy.
One of President Wilson's special advisors, Edward M.
House, had written in Foreign Affairs, that the tariff
problem the administration faced was,

"how to enable

foreigners to earn enough dollars here to pay their debts
and to take our exports, without the necessity of foreign
loans. 1125

Roosevelt received advice from others also, that

trade through reciprocal trade agreements could greatly help
recovery.

The plan would call for an unconditional most-

favored-nation status for those foreign countries which
entered into agreements.

This meant that a nation would

agree to lower tariffs on certain items when the U.S. did
likewise, and if third parties received better concessions
on the good in question, the U.S. would get the lower rate.
Hull received support in his efforts from groups like the
American Manufacturers Export Association and the National
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.
F oreign
Tra d e Counci. 1 . 25

The Act was eventually passed by

Congress in 1934.
The Trade Agreements Act was also part of Hull's
strategy to bring Germany into line through economic
measures.

Germany was embarking on a program of economic

autarky, or self-sufficiency, and in the process, was
beginning to take measures to ensure better trade balances.
The first act in pursuit of this goal was the announcement
on May 8, 1933, that they were suspending interest payments
on private debts to American bankers (excluding the Dawes
and Young Plan loans and any agreements made after July 15,
1931).

26

The lenders would receive only fifty percent in

transferable currency and the rest in scrip, which could be
used to purchase German goods or could be redeemed at a
Discount Bank for a fifty percent discount.

The result was

payment on only seventy-five percent of the total, the rest
subsidized German exporters.

Hull called this one of

Germany's "numerous colossal frauds . . . This was a
wholesale dishonest and fraudulent policy of the German
Government to rearm on a gigantic scale by robbing and
defrauding all other governments and their citizens of every
possible penny

• in order to promote German's scheme of

rearmament without precedent in magnitude."

27

Another

problem he referred to with these statements was a German
law that forbade the removal of profits from Germany of
American owned businesses operating there.

Furthermore,
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they "invented nearly a score of different reichsmarks with
varying exchange rates" and "A nation that made an economic
agreement with Germany seldom knew what it was getting in
return. 1129
The question was, what to do about these things, to
give some concessions in the hope it would get better, or to
retaliate and risk further damage to the United States'
economy.

The problem was complicated by the fact that the

United States had an enormously favorable trade balance with
Germany, unlike most other countries.

Britain for example,

simply seized the payments for German goods they imported
because they did not have a favorable trade balance with
Germany.

30

This strategy worked and Germany stopped

discriminating against British lenders.

The Germans also

chose not to discriminate against Swiss and Dutch
bondholders, for example, further angering the Americans and
indicating the lack of unified action in European politics
which alienated the United States.

31

The reaction was

usually to do nothing but protest.
George Peek, head of the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration, fought against Hull's trade policy and
wanted to increase trade with Germany at this time, even
after Schacht had announced in July of 1934 that Germany
would suspend payments on the Dawes and Young loans as well
as the others.

He tried to influence the President with

businessmen and bankers, who "advocated our making an
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arrangement with Germany whereby we would take more of her
goods in return for her paying the American holders of the
Dawes-Young loans".

32

The State Department set up a

committee to deal with this problem.

On October 12, 1934,

it concluded that no bilateral trade agreement with Germany
should be made, because "the whole complexion of affairs may
be quite different in a year or two.

It is not likely that

the current German commercial policy can last for any
considerable period of time."

33

Hull argued further,

that

any deal with Germany would undermine American efforts at
reciprocal trade deals elsewhere and make the United States
look hypocritical.

Hull won out but not before the Treasury

Department had imposed an increased tariff on German goods,
a retaliatory measure which prompted Germany to back off in
the trade war and debt discrimination.

34

Nonetheless,

German-American relations continued in a negative direction.
Despite the souring of official relations, relations
between German and American business firms continued to
evolve.

Many deals went on that contributed to the

rearmament of Germany, of which the State Department was
either unaware or chose not to interfere.

This indicated a

lack of coordination between government and business and an
undermining of the corporatist scheme.

Not only was there a

lack of coordination, but a lack of cooperation.

Typical of

this was the attitude of business during the ItalianEthiopian War, which began in October of 1935: they felt
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they could sell what they wanted, as long as it was legal,
and thus proceeded to triple the sale of oil to Italy in
less than two months.

35

This was in complete defiance of

Hull's response to the war: "I did not want the aggressor,
though forbidden to buy our arms, ammunition, and implements
of war, to buy the raw materials out of which he himself
could make the sinews of war.

Here was the beginning of our

moral embargo, so called because it rested on moral rather
than on legal foundations."

36

Gabriel Kolko's article,

"American Business and

Germany, 1930-1941", is full of examples of the trade that
went on with Germany which significantly aided German
preparedness for war, despite the public stance of American
business, which came out against fascism and Nazism.

37

To

begin with, there was the cartel-like collaboration of the
German chemical giant, I.G. Farben, which was highly
integrated into the government preparation and planning for
war, and the American giant, Du Pont.

I.G. Farben was

involved with exclusive deals with American businesses
despite the fact that many American businessmen knew that
38
·
1 ve d in
·
·
I.G. Far b en was invo
war p 1 anning.

Standard Oil

also entered into agreement with I.G. Farben in 1929 for
fear of market competition upsetting the world oil price.
This agreement actually went uncovered by the United States
government until 1941 and greatly contributed to I.G.
Farben's rubber development as well as resulting in patents
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for I.G. Farben to develop superior methods for making
explosives.

Standard Oil fulfilled these patent agreements

with I.G. Farben, depriving Britain and France, even after
the War began.

Furthermore, I.G. Farben received 20 million

dollars from the Nazi government, to buy aviation gas from
Standard, without the knowledge of the United States
government.

39

General Motors was also heavily involved in Germany,
producing not just motor cars.

Opel, a completely owned

subsidiary of G.M., together with Ford, was Germany's
largest tank producer by April of 1939, producing over half
of Germany's tanks.

4

°

For the Americans, motivated by a

fear of competition, profits were the guiding factor, and if
they could not export them, they would reinvest them in
Germany.

A spokesman for the Dow Chemical Company

maintained,
products.

"we do not inquire into the uses of the
We are interested in selling them."

41

At the

same time, the Germans looked at this business in terms of
political goals.
Kolko, a Marxist, concluded that the interest which
drove business during this period was class interest; that
profits and stability could best be gained by collaboration
in the business world in the form of cartels and market
agreements.

42

Their actions were not consistent with the

interests of the United States government nor with their own
publically stated anti-war position.

In this way, the
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corporatist model seemed to be turned around, as big
business influenced developments in German foreign policy
and thus indirectly, United States foreign policy, not only
without the consent and approval of the United States
government, but often without its knowledge as well.
All of this went against what some of Roosevelt's most
valued observers, such as George Messersmith, Consul General
in Berlin, advised.

He wanted to block trade negotiations

and bring on economic instability as a way to bring Hitler
down.

But even if this didn't work, the United States should

not deal with a nation "not willing to protect existing
interests, getting ready to repudiate its debts, and asking
for new agreements and new credits with which to get raw
materials, a good deal of which are destined for
rearmamen t · " 43

The Commercial Attache in Berlin, Douglas

Miller, also argued that there was nothing the United States
wanted or needed from Germany.

Hull, despite his belief in

the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, did not endorse making
such an agreement with Germany, especially after they
announced as part of their "new plan", that they would buy
only as much from a country as they sold.

A treaty was

signed, but without the most-favored-nation status.

Trade

declined to the point where Germany took less than half the
amount of imports they had taken from the United States
(from 8.4 percent of the United States export total, to 3.7
percent) from 1933 to 1938.

Similarly, during the same
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period, the United States share of Germany's total exports
declined from 5.4 to 3.3 percent. 44

But most significantly,

the export of chemicals, pharmaceuticals, oil, and base
metals to Germany increased, including the tripling of
petroleum exports from 1934 to 1938.

This led Messersmith

to comment in 1936, that American firms were "used for the
maintenance of German industrial progress and in some
important directions for German rearmament, which is
obviously not intended for defensive, but aggressive
measures."

45

Thus astute observers like Messersmith

realized that not only was business not in cooperation with
government policy, their actions worked against the State
Department goals of disarmament and a reduction in trade
with Germany.

1935 and early 1936 proved to be a most critical period
for both the deterioration of German-American relations and
for Hitler, in his effort to achieve his goals, including
the renunciation of the Versailles Treaty.

In March of 1935

he began the open repudiation of the Treaty by revealing the
existence of a military air force and plans for an army of

550,000 men, which prompted France to double the length of
service for its conscripts and Roosevelt to ask for the
largest peacetime defense budget in United States history.
Even before this, on October 1, 1934, Hitler had secretly
told Chief of Staff, Ludwig Beck, of his intent to order
conscription by April and to keep it secret until then.

47

46
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It was not that Britain and France did not know what
was going on.

Germany's departure from the League of

Nations and the Disarmament Conference had convinced most
observers that Hitler would attempt to rearm.

By March of

1934, Britain realized that Germany had possibly 350
military aircraft and could produce them at about a rate of

60 per month and that by March of 1935 they could have a
fully equipped army of 300,00o. 48

At this point, however,

their attitude was one of evading the issue because they
were still stronger than Germany and that the Treaty could
be changed if "negotiated".

British Foreign Secretary John

Simon wanted permission for Germany to rearm in exchange for
a comprehensive European settlement which would revise the
Treaty, which France rejected.

49

Britain and France, along

with Italy, condemned the German announcements of March 1935
one month later at the Stresa Conference, the last attempt
at coordination against aggression in Europe.

But they did

nothing and the conference produced nothing of substance.
Then in June, without consulting France or Italy, Britain
concluded a naval treaty with Germany, which allowed Germany
naval expansion to 35 percent of British tonnage and 60
percent of British submarine capability.

They were

negotiating, bilaterally, an end to the military provisions
of the Versailles Treaty.
Hull, Moffat, and Roosevelt all preferred to make no
statement and no official announcement was made regarding
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the developments of March.

As for the naval agreement

between Germany and Britain, the administration even felt it
50
th e rig
· h t d'irection.
·
·
was a s t ep in

Ambassador Luther was

able to report back to Berlin, that though the direction of
American policy might be hard to determine for the future,
at present the Congress would successfully prevent any
intervention in European affairs.

"In the final analysis

one respects the restoration of German military power as a
fact about which other nations can in effect, do nothing."

51

Hitler was beginning to realize that the United States
would do nothing and planned accordingly, despite repeated
warnings from the key American observers in Germany, Dodd
and Messersmith, who agreed that the continued existence of
the Nazi regime would give the United States "something to
reckon with" and that "innocent isolationism" would bring
grief.

52

Dodd had felt from the beginning that Nazi

aggression would probably lead to war without United States
intervention.

Even when Hitler made a supposedly peace-

seeking speech in May of 1935, Dodd saw the smokescreen:
"The Hitler speech was designed, very cleverly for him, to
divide his opponents and give the necessary time for
preparedness . . . the solid front of Stresa and Geneva is
weakening .

.

• inside Germany arms manufacturers of every

possible kind goes on night and day".

53

His assessment was

confirmed by the Anglo-German naval agreement.
Other key events and the way they were reacted to,

12S
showed that the United States was staying out of European
affairs, officially, and were to attempt no more of the
economic diplomacy of the earlier period.

Furthermore,

Roosevelt would withdraw from his own efforts to strengthen
his ability to influence foreign affairs, by deferring to
Congress on key provisions that would have given him more
power.
The Italian invasion of Ethiopia was encouraged by the
alienation of the allies, especially France and Italy,
caused by the Anglo-German naval deal.s

4

The United States

attempted to stay neutral as the Neutrality Act forbade
embargoing only an aggressor, as Hull and Roosevelt had
wanted, but applied to all parties at war.

American

business, despite Hull's "moral" embargo, continued to
supply Italy with crucial raw materials.

This same "moral"

embargo applied to Italy and Germany in their assistance to
the fascist cause in the Spanish Civil War.

The State

Department maintained that they could not put an arms
embargo on Germany or Italy because no official state of war
existed between them and Spain, despite the fact that
Germany contributed critical personnel and assistance in the
bombing and artillery phases of the war.SS

The embargo on

the Republican government in Spain helped the fascists win
the war.
The final indication that the United States would not
intervene in any way, came with the official reaction to
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Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland, which
effectively ended both the Versailles and Locarno Treaties.
Despite the fact that Ambassador Dodd had warned Foreign
Minister Neurath of possibly strict economic sanctions,
including a cut off in shipments of oil, steel, and cotton,
Hitler felt the moment was at hand and that only a French
show of military resistance would compel him to halt the
reoccupation by German troops of the Rhineland.

56

The

American Ambassador in France, Jesse Strauss, asked if
Roosevelt or Hull would issue an official protest.
did.

Roosevelt,

Neither

just one week before, had extended the

Neutrality Act of 1935 for another year, which would keep an
arms embargo on all entering a war, preventing support by
League members who would fight aggression.

On the Rhineland

remilitarization, the State Department maintained that the
United States had no part in Locarno and that it was not
United States business.

In his message to Strauss, Hull

just confirmed that "F.D.R. O.K." in response to this
posi. t.ion. 57

Ambassador Luther could write to the Foreign

Ministry about the State Department reaction, that "the
German step was to have been expected, that it is indeed
understandable, since, after all, it is German territory
which is involved, and that it promises a pacification of
the European atmosphere which would have been unthinkable as
long as Germany had not obtained full sovereignty".

Also,

"In Congress circles the reaction, with some exceptions, is

127
in general also sympathetic."

58

Roosevelt made one last attempt to deal with Germany
when he asked Dodd to notify him if there was an opportunity
that he might "personally and secretly" gain a response from
Hitler concerning peace and the German foreign policy goals
for the next ten years.

59

Dodd talked to Schacht, Hans

Dieckhoff, who handled American affairs for the Foreign
Ministry, and Neurath, all of whom reiterated the German
demands for colonies and a condemnation of the Franco-Soviet
rapproachment.

Roosevelt made no peace initiative and by

the end of the year, America regarded Europe's political
problems as "hopeless", according to Luther.

60

Roosevelt

did make one other attempt to set up a conference with the
British to explore cooperation, but British Prime Minister
Chamberlain felt it might be more provocative than
preventative, and it never came off.
Chamberlain had told Treasury Secretary Morganthau in
March, that the "greatest single contribution that the
United States could make at the present moment to the
preservation of world peace would be the amendment of the
existing neutrality legislation".

61

But once again,

domestic considerations swayed Roosevelt.

At this point in

1937 he was in a battle with Congress over the Supreme Court
and gave in on the Neutrality Bill as he had done before,
when pushing too hard for presidential discretion on arms
embargoes would have, he felt,

jeopardized New Deal domestic
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legislation.

In October of 1937, Roosevelt gave his

"Quarantine" speech, which indicated no change in policy,
only warnings about where the world was headed:

"a state of

international anarchy and instability from which there is no
escape through mere isolation or neutrality."

62

At this

point, German-American relations were almost dead and their
would be no more great initiatives to stabilize Europe,
economic or otherwise.

The corporatist approach had been

buried under an onslaught of isolation, economic
nationalism, the Depression, and Nazi militarism.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
It is not the purpose of this paper to explore what
happens to corporatism after World War II, though financial
intervention does begin to take place in Europe again at
that time.

The purpose of this thesis was to explore how

corporatism lost its way in the 1930's in American foreign
policy toward Germany.
factors.

It was defeated by a number of

The old dichotomy of isolationism versus

internationalism definitely played a part.

The Senate

established with its rejection of the Versailles Treaty that
it would not go along with European entanglements and so the
Republican administrations of the 1920's sought a way around
this obstacle, because they felt intervention would be
beneficial to United States interests in the long run; that
peace and prosperity could be purchased with American
financial intervention to stabilize Europe, which to a great
degree, entailed stabilizing Germany.
The corporatist method itself was partly responsible
for its own downfall in the 1930's.

It ignored political

realities and connections, especially the effects of massive
loans to German governments and the connection between
reparations and war debts.

Furthermore, it was not always

134
clear or certain that the corporatist scheme was a
premeditated plan or whether it was merely a reaction to
circumstances.

The loan control policy was an example of

the lack of collaboration and of clear goals.

One can not

blame just bankers for the Depression, but their
overextension to Germany was characteristic of one of the
causes of the Depression: speculation and lending without
sufficient caution.

The experts involved at the highest

levels, men like Gilbert, Lamont, and Schacht, all worked
against this speculative frenzy, but ultimately, without
success, indicating further,
lacking in cooperation.

that the whole scheme was

In addition, the use of financial

experts who did not represent the government was a reaction
to the desire of Congress to keep the United States out of
European affairs.
Finally Hoover, and then Roosevelt, as well as the
bankers themselves, realized the plan was not working and
they had to turn to new tactics.

By 1932, Hoover began

working for international conferences that would involve
statesmen and diplomats.

By 1933, Roosevelt was sending

senators and department heads to London to iron out the
economic difficulties the United States and Europe faced.
He was also taking on the policy process himself, both with
his influence over the American delegations at the
conferences in London and Geneva, and with his speeches that
were tailored for Hitler's consumption.
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The United States had put its relations with Germany on
an economic basis for much of the inter-war period and
realized too late that this influence would have little
effect on the Nazi regime.

Unfortunately, the corporatist

relationship had declined so significantly, that American
business was able to contribute to the Nazi build-up,
against the best interests of the United States, unlike the
1920's, when government and the financial sector shared a
vision of what was best for the United States.
1930's, business defied Hull's "moral" embargo.

In the
By the late

1930's, the government of the U.S. had turned inward to an
extent that made initiatives toward Germany and Europe
difficult, and they could only wait for war to come and then
react to it.

Corporatism had not carried United States

foreign policy toward Germany through the Depression and was
found wanting in dealing with the Nazi government that
emerged from the economic catastrophe.
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